Add initial support for the Cortex-M55 Core which is an implementation
of the Armv8.1-M mainline architecture and includes support for the
M‑profile Vector Extension (MVE).
The support is based on the Cortex-M33 support that already exists in
Zephyr.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Gala <kumar.gala@linaro.org>
Add exception descriptions of mcause id 6~15. Also print mtval CSR for
memory access fault & illegal instruction exceptions.
Signed-off-by: Jim Shu <cwshu@andestech.com>
STATUS32.DZ(bit 13) is the EV_DivZero exception enable bit, and it's
not enabled by default. we need to set it explicitly to enable divide
zero exception on early boot and each thread's setup.
The DZ bit is ignored on write and read as zero when there is no
hardware division configured. So we can simply set DZ bit even if
there is no hardware division configured.
Signed-off-by: Watson Zeng <zhiwei@synopsys.com>
GCC10 introduced by default calls to out-of-line helpers to implement
atomic operations with the '-moutline-atomic' option. This is breaking
several tests because the embedded calls are trying to access the
zephyr_data region from userspace that is declared as MT_P_RW_U_NA,
triggering a memory fault.
Since there is currently no support for MT_P_RW_U_RO (and probably never
will be), disable the out-of-line helpers disabling the GCC option.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <ccaione@baylibre.com>
It is apparently possible for one CPU to change the memory domain
of a thread already being executed on another CPU.
All CPUs must ensure they're using the appropriate mapping after a
thread is newly added to a domain.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <npitre@baylibre.com>
Introduce the necessary routines to have the user thread stack correctly
mapped and the functions to swap page tables on context switch.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <ccaione@baylibre.com>
The only user of arch_mem_domain_destroy was the deprecated
k_mem_domain_destroy function which has now been removed. So remove
arch_mem_domain_destroy as well.
Signed-off-by: Kumar Gala <kumar.gala@linaro.org>
There's no need to duplicate the linker section for each architecture.
Instead, move the section declaration to common-rom.ld.
Signed-off-by: Carles Cufi <carles.cufi@nordicsemi.no>
This unifies all the display of region size in hex.
Some of them are there to aid in figuring out the end of
a memory region so it is easier if they are already in hex.
This also fixes the display of address range where the end
is off by one and should be (base + size - 1).
Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
After page table is load, we should be executing in virtual
address space. Therefore we need to set ESP to the virtual
address of interrupt stack for the boot process.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
This reverts commit d40e8ede8e.
This fixes triple faults after wiping the identity mapping of
physical memory when running entering userspace.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
This reverts commit 7d32e9f9a5.
We now allow the kernel to be linked virtually. This patch:
- Properly converts between virtual/physical addresses
- Handles early boot instruction pointer transition
- Double-maps SRAM to both virtual and physical locations
in boot page tables to facilitate instruction pointer
transition, with logic to clean this up after completed.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
This reuses the page directory pointer table (PAE=y) or page
directory (PAE=n) to point to next level page directory table
(PAE=y) or page tables (PAE=n) to identity map the physical
memory. This gets rid of the extra memory needed to host
the extra mappings which are only used at boot. Following
patches will have code to actual unmap physical memory
during the boot process, so this avoids some wasting of
memory.
Since no extra memory needs to be reserved, this also reverts
commit ee3d345c09
("x86: mmu: reserve more space for page table if linking in virt").
Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
This allows specifying second --verbose in command line to
enable more messages. Two new ones have been added to aid
in debugging code for mapping and setting permission to
a single page.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
There actually is no need for a separate kconfig here, as
the kernel VM address and SRAM address can be used to figure
out if the kernel is linked in virtual address space.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
There is no need to use this kconfig, as the phys-to-virt
offset is enough to figure out if the kernel is linked in
virtual address space in gen_mmu.py.
For code, use Z_VM_KERNEL instead.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
With the introduction of Z_MEM_*_ADDR for physical<->virtual
address translation, there is no need to have x86 specific
versions.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
Pretty crude for now, as we always invalidate the entire set.
It remains to be seen if more fined grained TLB flushing is worth
the added complexity given this ought to be a relatively rare event.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <npitre@baylibre.com>
Introduce the basic support code for memory domains. To each domain
is associated a top page table which is a copy of the global kernel
one. When a partition is added, corresponding memory range is made
private before its mapping is adjusted.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <ccaione@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <npitre@baylibre.com>
We need to protect against concurrent modifications to page tables and
their use counts.
It would have been nice to have one lock per domain, but we heavily
share page tables across domains. Hence the global lock.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <npitre@baylibre.com>
Two scenarios are possible.
privatize_page_range:
Affected pages are made private if they're not. This means a whole
new page branch starting from the top may be allocated and content
shared with the reference page tables, except for the private range
where content is duplicated.
globalize_page_range:
That's the reverse operation where pages for given range is shared with
the reference page tables and no longer needed pages are freed.
When changing a domain mapping the range needs to be privatized first.
When changing a global mapping the range needs to be globalized last.
This way page table sharing across domains is maximized and memory
usage remains optimal.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <npitre@baylibre.com>
Make the allocation, population and linking of a new table into
a function of its own for easier code reuse.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <npitre@baylibre.com>
As of today during the Zephyr start we
- invalidate I$
- disable I$
- enable I$
Given that we don't need to have I$ disabled during any
initialization period and ARC processors have caches enabled
after reset the I$ disabling/enabling is excessive, so we can
drop it.
By that we also aligh the I$ initialization on ARC with other
projects like U-boot and Linux kernel.
Signed-off-by: Eugeniy Paltsev <Eugeniy.Paltsev@synopsys.com>
As we have removed MPU_STACK_GUARD for ARC_MPU_VER 2, we also
need to remove ARCH_HAS_STACK_PROTECTION for boards with
ARC_MPU_VER 2 and no hardware stack checking, relative commit:
commit(arch: arc: remove MPU_STACK_GUARD for ARC_MPU_VER 2)
in pull request #24021
Signed-off-by: Watson Zeng <zhiwei@synopsys.com>
Since the removal of Quark-based boards, there are no user of
Minute-IA. Also, the generic x86 SoC is not exactly Minute-IA
so change it to use a fairly safe CPU_ATOM.
Fixes#14442
Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
Can only be written at the highest Exception level implemented.
For example, if EL3 is the highest implemented Exception level,
CNTFRQ_EL0 can only be written at EL3.
Also move z_arm64_el_highest_plat_init to be called when is_el_highest
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
This patch adds the code managing the syscalls. The privileged stack
is setup before jumping into the real syscall.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <ccaione@baylibre.com>
This leverages the AT (address translation) instruction to test for
given access permission. The result is then provided in the PAR_EL1
register.
Thanks to @jharris-intel for the suggestion.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <npitre@baylibre.com>
Introduce the arch_user_string_nlen() assembly routine and the necessary
C code bits.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <ccaione@baylibre.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <npitre@baylibre.com>
User mode is only allowed to induce oopses and stack check failures via
software-triggered system fatal exceptions.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <ccaione@baylibre.com>
The arch_is_user_context() function is relying on the content of the
tpidrro_el0 register to determine whether we are in user context or not.
This register is set to '1' when in EL1 and set back to '0' when user
threads are running in userspace.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <ccaione@baylibre.com>
Introduce the first pieces needed to schedule user threads by defining
two different code paths for kernel and user threads.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <ccaione@baylibre.com>
If EL2 is implemented but we're skipping EL2, we should still
do EL2 init. Otherwise we end up with a bunch of things still
at their (unknown) reset values.
This in particular causes problems when different
cores have different virtual timer offsets.
Signed-off-by: James Harris <james.harris@intel.com>
There are several issues with the current implemenation of the
{inc,dec}_nest_counter macros.
The first problem is that it's internally using a call to a misplaced
function called z_arm64_curr_cpu() (for some unknown reason hosted in
irq_manage.c) that could potentially clobber the caller-saved registers
without any notice to the user of the macro.
The second problem is that being a macro the clobbered registers should
be specified at the calling site, this is not possible given the current
implementation.
To fix these issues and make the call quicker, this patch rewrites the
code in assembly leveraging the availability of the _curr_cpu array. It
now clobbers only two registers passed from the calling site.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <ccaione@baylibre.com>
Null-pointer exception detection using DWT is currently incompatible
with current openocd runner default implementation that leaves debug
mode on by default.
As a consequence, on all targets that use openocd runner, null-pointer
exception detection using DWT will generated an assert.
As a consequence, all tests are failing on such platforms.
Disable this until openocd behavior is fixed (#32984) and enable
the MPU based solution for now.
Signed-off-by: Erwan Gouriou <erwan.gouriou@linaro.org>
When we reach this code in interrupt context, our upper GPRs contain a
cross-stack call that may still include some registers from the
interrupted thread. Those need to go out to memory before we can do
our cache coherence dance here.
Signed-off-by: Andy Ross <andrew.j.ross@intel.com>
Both new thread creation and context switch had the same mistake in
cache management: the bottom of the stack (the "unused" region between
the lower memory bound and the live stack pointer) needs to be
invalidated before we switch, because otherwise any dirty lines we
might have left over can get flushed out on top of the same thread on
another CPU that is putting live data there.
Signed-off-by: Andy Ross <andrew.j.ross@intel.com>
The Xtensa L1 cache layer has straightforward semantics accessible via
single-instructions that operate on cache lines via physical
addresses. These are very amenable to inlining.
Unfortunately the Xtensa HAL layer requires function calls to do this,
leading to significant code waste at the calling site, an extra frame
on the stack and needless runtime instructions for situations where
the call is over a constant region that could elide the loop. This is
made even worse because the HAL library is not built with
-ffunction-sections, so pulling in even one of these tiny cache
functions has the effect of importing a 1500-byte object file into the
link!
Add our own tiny cache layer to include/arch/xtensa/cache.h and use
that instead.
Signed-off-by: Andy Ross <andrew.j.ross@intel.com>
Back when I started work on this stuff, I had a set of notes on
register windows that slowly evolved into something that looks like
formal documentation. There really isn't any overview-style
documentation of this stuff on the public internet, so it couldn't
hurt to commit it here for posterity.
Signed-off-by: Andy Ross <andrew.j.ross@intel.com>