Channel context was cleared before calling bt_gatt_disconnected
which resulted in passing NULL conn to it.
Change-Id: I486d1cf6662716584c2c973366a9c9654f499802
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <ext.szymon.janc@tieto.com>
Introduce new UUID API with bt_uuid, bt_uuid_16 and bt_uuid_32
structs. The specific size structs are derived from the common bt_uuid
struct to make it possible to use CONTAINER_OF().
Change-Id: I9cb03c73406acb7768d410fdf29eae75d252163c
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
To access the 16-bit value of GATT UUIDs it's quite overkill to first
create anonymous UUID structs and then access the value member from
them. We can simplify this a lot with the help of the recently added
UUID value definitions.
Change-Id: Ib58012c20d07b3e60e5911cea6feb73301d1323c
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
This enables simpler permissions as it is not longer needed to include
BT_GATT_PERM_READ or BT_GATT_PERM_WRITE.
Change-Id: I0c749b75bedb125bda8ea451474c82eec13d3c38
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
We shouldn't respond with an error if the read of UUID failed.
It's because we don't know if this UUID was the one that client
requested in the Find by Type Value request.
Change-Id: I34c336b9afc3520194fbddaaee8a44d51beabad5
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
This fixes bug where wrong service handles have been sent while
discovering the primary services. We should skip Secondary Service
contained in range 0x0006-0x0009 in this case:
> ACL Data RX: Handle 64 flags 0x02 dlen 13 [hci0] 619772.398445
ATT: Find By Type Value Request (0x06) len 8
Handle range: 0x0001-0xffff
Attribute type: Primary Service (0x2800)
UUID: Generic Access Profile (0x1800)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 64 flags 0x00 dlen 9 [hci0] 619772.403821
ATT: Find By Type Value Response (0x07) len 4
Handle range: 0x0001-0x0009
With this patch:
> ACL Data RX: Handle 64 flags 0x02 dlen 13 [hci0] 618945.922607
ATT: Find By Type Value Request (0x06) len 8
Handle range: 0x0001-0xffff
Attribute type: Primary Service (0x2800)
UUID: Generic Access Profile (0x1800)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 64 flags 0x00 dlen 9 [hci0] 618945.927933
ATT: Find By Type Value Response (0x07) len 4
Handle range: 0x0001-0x0005
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
Change-Id: I7bb743e8787bc294ba447be5e21e250f0128ec68
This fixes invalid att pointer dereference to get the tx MTU size.
Change-Id: Ifc7911ee58fd4ddff10d1839aff5df9a6e805de8
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
This fixes bug where wrong service handles have been sent while
discovering the primary services. We should skip Secondary Service
contained in range 0x0006-0x0009 in this case:
ATT: Read By Group Type Response (0x11) len 13
Attribute data length: 6
Attribute group list: 2 entries
Handle range: 0x0001-0x0009
UUID: Generic Access Profile (0x1800)
Handle range: 0x000a-0x000e
UUID: Unknown (0xaa50)
With this patch:
ATT: Read By Group Type Response (0x11) len 13
Attribute data length: 6
Attribute group list: 2 entries
Handle range: 0x0001-0x0005
UUID: Generic Access Profile (0x1800)
Handle range: 0x000a-0x000e
UUID: Unknown (0xaa50)
Change-Id: I8121521e76476826296a2bedf9e18ef008f81363
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
There is no need for using conn security calback while l2cap
channel provides encryption callback.
Change-Id: I84872bca7a7b4334b52810bafd0faa2bb1e381de
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <ext.szymon.janc@tieto.com>
According to Core Specification 4.2 Vol 3, Part G, 3.3.3.4,
Server Characteristic Configuration descriptor shall be:
"Readable with no authentication or authorization.
Writable with authentication and authorization defined by a
higher layer specification or is implementation specific."
So there shall be separate authorization permissions
for write and read access.
Change-Id: Ia2850acbb976571743bf96cf9cbe0c1128534073
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
This makes it simpler to add the services directly into GATT services
table.
Change-Id: I090c7f9396329cf524947dd6647230c663a55f60
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
This patch fixes warning that ATT MTU exceeded. An opcode size should
be taken into account.
Change-Id: Ia69c9514a59767542cca0ef36fc77d896d20db28
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
Make newline part of log macros so that caller doesn't have to
append '\n' every time logs are used. This make sure that no
log will be missing new line which results in concatenated log
messages.
Change-Id: I3231ae747c790816dbc1608e0a3bd56467ba0a1b
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <ext.szymon.janc@tieto.com>
Error should be responded if no previous attribute of the same type was
read (added to response buffer). In case if previous attributes were
added to buffer no error should be responded and read initiator should
perform read by type with increased start handle.
Change-Id: I31c4469e172a496890f049d9304a03673506c5f3
Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Kolodziejczyk <grzegorz.kolodziejczyk@tieto.com>
The attribute protocol Read By Type is used to perform
Read Using Characteristic UUID procedure. This procedure
is used to read characteristic value if Characteristic Value UUID
is known, while handle is not known.
Errors received from application like Insufficient Encryption
Key Size must be send as a response to Read By Type Request
> ACL Data RX: Handle 64 flags 0x02 dlen 11 [hci0] 94382.244804
ATT: Read By Type Request (0x08) len 6
Handle range: 0x0003-0x0003
Attribute type: Unknown (0xaa51)
< ACL Data TX: Handle 64 flags 0x00 dlen 9 [hci0] 94382.255987
ATT: Error Response (0x01) len 4
Read By Type Request (0x08)
Handle: 0x0003
Error: Insufficient Encryption Key Size (0x0c)
With this patch we can pass TC_GAR_SR_BI_11_C test.
Change-Id: Id47109f673cb725b2edd9cc0e154cc055fc8d0ef
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
This patch fixes checking permissions and sending response to read by
type request. If multiple (or if one is found) attributess are found
within handle range and first of them don't have read permission,
error should be send. If any of attribute don't have read permission
but isn't first in set, the attributes before this attribute should
be returned.
Change-Id: I532a8701521505c02845de5db62c94f7edc9d567
Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Kolodziejczyk <grzegorz.kolodziejczyk@tieto.com>
Don't generate error response for invalid offset or invalid
attribute value during queued write requests.
According to BT SIG specification such response needs to be done when
execute write request is performed.
Change-Id: If480228dc98f5713891b45b3f5ca31990cf5c633
Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Lichwa <arkadiusz.lichwa@tieto.com>
The cloned buffer is used to retry in case a security error happen but
since the buffer pool is now limited the callback may actually block if
it creates a new request which would need 2 buffers (original + clone)
but only one is available since the previous request clone is not
released yet.
Change-Id: Ife508b09c4b326b8213fd0b130ebf3c2e7fe47c9
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
When sending ATT packets we may need to clone the original buffer.
Because of this one buffer per connection is not enough. Add one extra
buffer to the pool to cover for this.
Change-Id: I9fd9cb806f79ff99f1415a0fd7293ef0baf1d3f9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
It's more intuitive to specify needed MTU sizes instead of raw buffer
sizes. The exact buffer size calculations can instead be made
internally in the code (using the BT_L2CAP_BUF_SIZE helper macro).
Change-Id: I0637340a7d99e04020f57f49ecd8e6dcfcc4bcf4
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
With this split we get better control of the buffer sizes and counts.
We also anyway will need a fragments pool so a simple generic ACL_OUT
pool doesn't make sense anymore. The related Kconfig options for that
have been removed.
Change-Id: I616cf49915a1cc0dc0ddc724e2e182bcbe0c80f6
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
This patch adds bt_conn_enc_key_size function which will be used
by application to check encryption keys size of a encrypted connection.
This will be used especialy by GATT applications, because some
attributes to be accessed require encryption with specified
minimum encryption key length.
> ACL Data RX: Handle 64 flags 0x02 dlen 7 [hci0] 708547.536685
ATT: Read Request (0x0a) len 2
Handle: 0x0003
< ACL Data TX: Handle 64 flags 0x00 dlen 9 [hci0] 708547.544302
ATT: Error Response (0x01) len 4
Read Request (0x0a)
Handle: 0x0003
Error: Insufficient Encryption Key Size (0x0c)
Change-Id: Idbc9afde7ec80504898bd8d1e193f3e71a93f3f9
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
This simplify the handling quite a bit while the application can still
prevent the buffer to be freed by referencing it if necessary.
Change-Id: I5ed0e96e8d9e349b79ba31ba9568af61181e1065
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Convert the code to use the net_buf API instead of the soon to be
removed bt_buf API.
Change-Id: I89e5ac5a178cf57c0a3f7fee38d1170c25e07c5b
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
This make use of bt_uuid_to_str to when printing UUID values, to make it
simpler when it is just going to print so the patch introduces a new
function that does the conversion in place using a static variable.
Change-Id: Idfedf05a5ad201653fff2e01387f046cd5647c83
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
This patch cleans up the code a bit. BT_ATT_MAX_LE_MTU defines
MTU that can be used over LE ATT.
Change-Id: Ie433f33f3bcba3275f51e1bea826bb0fd061c45f
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
If attribute requires authentication to be read or written,
we check if current security level (should be BT_SECURITY_HIGH
or higher) allows to perform such operations on this attribute.
Change-Id: Ibba542ac96af00722370eba77d6c929cda520fd8
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
This refactorer fixed channel data so that the channel itself carries
any extra context necessary.
Change-Id: Iea0f29fb7913a29dccdcbef72d92ec4cf4711bf3
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
This split L2CAP API so that server API is available to applications
while the rest of the API is keep internal to the stack.
Change-Id: I031926ff906ce100684fba0947b2e9eb2c8fcaeb
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
To have same logs in att_mtu_req and att_mtu_rsp.
Change-Id: Ic820f989d0928089d5b0a6bce21e5e1c369eb026
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
According to the Core Spec 4.2 Vol 3 Part G
The server shall respond with the Server Rx MTU parameter set to the
maximum MTU that this server can receive.
Once the messages have been exchanged, the ATT_MTU shall be set
to the minimum of the Client Rx MTU and Server Rx MTU values.
bt: att_mtu_req (0x0010fd04): Client MTU 672
bt: att_mtu_req (0x0010fd04): Server MTU 65
bt: att_mtu_req (0x0010fd04): Negotiated MTU 65
bt: att_mtu_req (0x0010fd04): Client MTU 42
bt: att_mtu_req (0x0010fd04): Server MTU 65
bt: att_mtu_req (0x0010fd04): Negotiated MTU 42
Change-Id: I13f2f0fc99e99d8188ed15bf7972a9b892612e11
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
According to the Core Spec we shall respond to Exchange MTU Request
with MTU parameter set to the maximum MTU that we can receive.
As a Client, we shouldn't send an error if Server's Rx MTU exceeds
517 bytes. Whe should respond with our maximum MTU, because
after negotiation is done, ATT_MTU shall be set to the
minimum of the Client Rx MTU and Server Rx MTU values.
Error will be sent only in case of Rx MTU lower than LE default
ATT_MTU (23).
Change-Id: I9fa4f3fdb9b8129d52fc7b2557129c0894e5d201
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
According to Core 4.2 Vol 3 Part F 3.3, Commands have 6th bit
(startting from 0) set in ATT PDU. If the bit is set, no response shall be sent.
Change-Id: I63f7303e1cf2f9479dae129cdf5d31d7aadc739d
Signed-off-by: Mariusz Skamra <mariusz.skamra@tieto.com>
According to Core Specification "An Error Response shall be sent by
the server in response to the Read Multiple Request if insufficient
authentication, insufficient authorization, insufficient encryption
key size is used by the client, or if a read operation is not permitted
on any of the Characteristic Values. The Error Code parameter is set as
specified in the Attribute Protocol."
If any handle used by client is invalid we should return and error.
Change-Id: I5489ce6284531822676a63edf13db23289866102
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <ext.szymon.janc@tieto.com>
Change all the Intel and Wind River code license from BSD-3 to Apache 2.
Change-Id: Id8be2c1c161a06ea8a0b9f38e17660e11dbb384b
Signed-off-by: Javier B Perez Hernandez <javier.b.perez.hernandez@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Anas Nashif <anas.nashif@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Walsh <benjamin.walsh@windriver.com>
This allows to not compile SMP support for devices that don't
require pairing. It is required to support SMP channel and reply
with error for any command received even if pairing is not supported.
To handle this cleanly a null smp implementation is used that case.
Change-Id: I656a52dac882839db904eee65f25a4e29ea2d8c2
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <ext.szymon.janc@tieto.com>
All required includes should be placed in source file that includes
internal header.
Change-Id: I161e7ebe2e62377ea4cf03f759d48f5900103076
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <ext.szymon.janc@tieto.com>
Writes to GATT attribute that has no write permission set, should
return write not permitted (BT_ATT_ERR_WRITE_NOT_PERMITTED)
in check permission routine.
Change-Id: I95f0988e171294cd98b79d3e7b518383ac47567d
Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Lichwa <arkadiusz.lichwa@tieto.com>
Move parts of the API that are not usable for applications to
an internal header.
Change-Id: Idbcd3db8acda74375ea9deec2bf3d7eddc8a4ddb
Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <ext.szymon.janc@tieto.com>
If no attribute with given handle is found in database then invalid
handle error should be set and returned. If attribute is found then
pre-set invalid handle error will be cleared.
Change-Id: I4119877bb72693e18003399f9b6764666f801fe4
Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Kolodziejczyk <grzegorz.kolodziejczyk@tieto.com>
If the remote response with encryption/authentication error attempt to
elevate the security and retry sending the request:
bt: bt_att_recv (0x00112e0c): Received ATT code 0x01 len 5
bt: att_error_rsp (0x00112e0c): request 0x0a handle 0x0018 error 0x0f
bt: security_changed (0x00112e0c): conn 0x0010f5ac level 1
bt: security_changed (0x00112e0c): Retrying
bt: bt_att_recv (0x00112e0c): Received ATT code 0x0b len 1
bt: att_handle_read_rsp (0x00112e0c):
bt: att_read_rsp (0x00112e0c): err 0x00
Change-Id: I9d74fb50385c39b2092357f4fd6912a3eb041442
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Clone request buffer so it can later be used to validate the response.
Change-Id: I306f7b01a9a72a6c4b8e97c30789247b28428365
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
The minimal/start valid handle value is 1.
Change-Id: Ief3be01d0bf76193350b7632aedebc559d368810
Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Kolodziejczyk <grzegorz.kolodziejczyk@tieto.com>
Att data structure passed to read_type callback wasn't set properly
with connection data. This cause parsing att struct set to 0 (casted
in cb, set in att_read_type_rsp). Wrong att data caused parsing wrong
mtu size and whole conn structure.
Change-Id: Ib0aa4b8edca4965afd746e7186a08cfa34e62cf3
Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Kolodziejczyk <grzegorz.kolodziejczyk@tieto.com>
