ext: lib: crypto: Update mbedTLS 2.14.1

Since 2.12.0 release mbedTLS has an important security fix concerning
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption (CVE-2018-19608). Besides that it has very
few API changes, and the usual set of functional improvements, security
fixes and bug fixes. A list with all changes can be found in:

  ./ext/lib/crypto/mbedtls/ChangeLog

It should also be noted that the small change concerning _POSIX_C_SOURCE
applied to x509.c has been moved to platform_util.c, this time with a
proper define guard.

Signed-off-by: Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>
This commit is contained in:
Aurelien Jarno 2018-12-14 00:22:16 +01:00 committed by Anas Nashif
commit 68086c09ad
90 changed files with 6770 additions and 1752 deletions

View file

@ -1,5 +1,237 @@
mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
= mbed TLS 2.14.1 branch released 2018-11-30
Security
* Fix timing variations and memory access variations in RSA PKCS#1 v1.5
decryption that could lead to a Bleichenbacher-style padding oracle
attack. In TLS, this affects servers that accept ciphersuites based on
RSA decryption (i.e. ciphersuites whose name contains RSA but not
(EC)DH(E)). Discovered by Eyal Ronen (Weizmann Institute), Robert Gillham
(University of Adelaide), Daniel Genkin (University of Michigan),
Adi Shamir (Weizmann Institute), David Wong (NCC Group), and Yuval Yarom
(University of Adelaide, Data61). The attack is described in more detail
in the paper available here: http://cat.eyalro.net/cat.pdf CVE-2018-19608
* In mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(), don't leak the exact size of the number
via branching and memory access patterns. An attacker who could submit
a plaintext for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption but only observe the timing
of the decryption and not its result could nonetheless decrypt RSA
plaintexts and forge RSA signatures. Other asymmetric algorithms may
have been similarly vulnerable. Reported by Eyal Ronen, Robert Gillham,
Daniel Genkin, Adi Shamir, David Wong and Yuval Yarom.
* Wipe sensitive buffers on the stack in the CTR_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG
modules.
API Changes
* The new functions mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() and
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() are similar to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update()
and mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update() respectively, but the new functions
report errors whereas the old functions return void. We recommend that
applications use the new functions.
= mbed TLS 2.14.0 branch released 2018-11-19
Security
* Fix overly strict DN comparison when looking for CRLs belonging to a
particular CA. This previously led to ignoring CRLs when the CRL's issuer
name and the CA's subject name differed in their string encoding (e.g.,
one using PrintableString and the other UTF8String) or in the choice of
upper and lower case. Reported by Henrik Andersson of Bosch GmbH in issue
#1784.
* Fix a flawed bounds check in server PSK hint parsing. In case the
incoming message buffer was placed within the first 64KiB of address
space and a PSK-(EC)DHE ciphersuite was used, this allowed an attacker
to trigger a memory access up to 64KiB beyond the incoming message buffer,
potentially leading to an application crash or information disclosure.
* Fix mbedtls_mpi_is_prime() to use more rounds of probabilistic testing. The
previous settings for the number of rounds made it practical for an
adversary to construct non-primes that would be erroneously accepted as
primes with high probability. This does not have an impact on the
security of TLS, but can matter in other contexts with numbers chosen
potentially by an adversary that should be prime and can be validated.
For example, the number of rounds was enough to securely generate RSA key
pairs or Diffie-Hellman parameters, but was insufficient to validate
Diffie-Hellman parameters properly.
See "Prime and Prejudice" by by Martin R. Albrecht and Jake Massimo and
Kenneth G. Paterson and Juraj Somorovsky.
Features
* Add support for temporarily suspending expensive ECC computations after
some configurable amount of operations. This is intended to be used in
constrained, single-threaded systems where ECC is time consuming and can
block other operations until they complete. This is disabled by default,
but can be enabled by MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE at compile time and
configured by mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() at runtime. It applies to the new
xxx_restartable functions in ECP, ECDSA, PK and X.509 (CRL not supported
yet), and to existing functions in ECDH and SSL (currently only
implemented client-side, for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphersuites in TLS 1.2,
including client authentication).
* Add support for Arm CPU DSP extensions to accelerate asymmetric key
operations. On CPUs where the extensions are available, they can accelerate
MPI multiplications used in ECC and RSA cryptography. Contributed by
Aurelien Jarno.
* Extend RSASSA-PSS signature to allow a smaller salt size. Previously, PSS
signature always used a salt with the same length as the hash, and returned
an error if this was not possible. Now the salt size may be up to two bytes
shorter. This allows the library to support all hash and signature sizes
that comply with FIPS 186-4, including SHA-512 with a 1024-bit key.
* Add support for 128-bit keys in CTR_DRBG. Note that using keys shorter
than 256 bits limits the security of generated material to 128 bits.
API Changes
* Add a common error code of `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED` for
a feature that is not supported by underlying alternative
implementations implementing cryptographic primitives. This is useful for
hardware accelerators that don't implement all options or features.
New deprecations
* All module specific errors following the form
MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE that indicate a feature is not
supported are deprecated and are now replaced by the new equivalent
platform error.
* All module specific generic hardware acceleration errors following the
form MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_HW_ACCEL_FAILED that are deprecated and are replaced
by the equivalent plaform error.
* Deprecate the function mbedtls_mpi_is_prime() in favor of
mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows specifying the number of
Miller-Rabin rounds.
Bugfix
* Fix wrong order of freeing in programs/ssl/ssl_server2 example
application leading to a memory leak in case both
MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C and MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE are set.
Fixes #2069.
* Fix a bug in the update function for SSL ticket keys which previously
invalidated keys of a lifetime of less than a 1s. Fixes #1968.
* Fix failure in hmac_drbg in the benchmark sample application, when
MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is defined. Found by TrinityTonic, #1095
* Fix a bug in the record decryption routine ssl_decrypt_buf()
which lead to accepting properly authenticated but improperly
padded records in case of CBC ciphersuites using Encrypt-then-MAC.
* Fix memory leak and freeing without initialization in the example
program programs/x509/cert_write. Fixes #1422.
* Ignore IV in mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() when the cipher mode is
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB. Found by ezdevelop. Fixes #1091.
* Zeroize memory used for buffering or reassembling handshake messages
after use.
* Use `mbedtls_platform_zeroize()` instead of `memset()` for zeroization
of sensitive data in the example programs aescrypt2 and crypt_and_hash.
* Change the default string format used for various X.509 DN attributes to
UTF8String. Previously, the use of the PrintableString format led to
wildcards and non-ASCII characters being unusable in some DN attributes.
Reported by raprepo in #1860 and by kevinpt in #468. Fix contributed by
Thomas-Dee.
* Fix compilation failure for configurations which use compile time
replacements of standard calloc/free functions through the macros
MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO.
Reported by ole-de and ddhome2006. Fixes #882, #1642 and #1706.
Changes
* Removed support for Yotta as a build tool.
* Add tests for session resumption in DTLS.
* Close a test gap in (D)TLS between the client side and the server side:
test the handling of large packets and small packets on the client side
in the same way as on the server side.
* Change the dtls_client and dtls_server samples to work by default over
IPv6 and optionally by a build option over IPv4.
* Change the use of Windows threading to use Microsoft Visual C++ runtime
calls, rather than Win32 API calls directly. This is necessary to avoid
conflict with C runtime usage. Found and fixed by irwir.
* Remember the string format of X.509 DN attributes when replicating
X.509 DNs. Previously, DN attributes were always written in their default
string format (mostly PrintableString), which could lead to CRTs being
created which used PrintableStrings in the issuer field even though the
signing CA used UTF8Strings in its subject field; while X.509 compliant,
such CRTs were rejected in some applications, e.g. some versions of
Firefox, curl and GnuTLS. Reported in #1033 by Moschn. Fix contributed by
Thomas-Dee.
* Improve documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result().
Fixes #517 reported by github-monoculture.
* Add MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR flag to mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime() and
use it to reduce error probability in RSA key generation to levels mandated
by FIPS-186-4.
= mbed TLS 2.13.1 branch released 2018-09-06
API Changes
* Extend the platform module with an abstraction mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r()
whose implementation should behave as a thread-safe version of gmtime().
This allows users to configure such an implementation at compile time when
the target system cannot be deduced automatically, by setting the option
MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT. At this stage Mbed TLS is only able to
automatically select implementations for Windows and POSIX C libraries.
Bugfix
* Fix build failures on platforms where only gmtime() is available but
neither gmtime_r() nor gmtime_s() are present. Fixes #1907.
= mbed TLS 2.13.0 branch released 2018-08-31
Security
* Fix an issue in the X.509 module which could lead to a buffer overread
during certificate extensions parsing. In case of receiving malformed
input (extensions length field equal to 0), an illegal read of one byte
beyond the input buffer is made. Found and analyzed by Nathan Crandall.
Features
* Add support for fragmentation of outgoing DTLS handshake messages. This
is controlled by the maximum fragment length as set locally or negotiated
with the peer, as well as by a new per-connection MTU option, set using
mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu().
* Add support for auto-adjustment of MTU to a safe value during the
handshake when flights do not get through (RFC 6347, section 4.1.1.1,
last paragraph).
* Add support for packing multiple records within a single datagram,
enabled by default.
* Add support for buffering out-of-order handshake messages in DTLS.
The maximum amount of RAM used for this can be controlled by the
compile-time constant MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING defined
in mbedtls/config.h.
API Changes
* Add function mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing() to configure
the use of datagram packing (enabled by default).
Bugfix
* Fix a potential memory leak in mbedtls_ssl_setup() function. An allocation
failure in the function could lead to other buffers being leaked.
* Fixes an issue with MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C which would not compile if
MBEDTLS_ARC4_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER weren't also defined. #1890
* Fix a memory leak in ecp_mul_comb() if ecp_precompute_comb() fails.
Fix contributed by Espressif Systems.
* Add ecc extensions only if an ecc based ciphersuite is used.
This improves compliance to RFC 4492, and as a result, solves
interoperability issues with BouncyCastle. Raised by milenamil in #1157.
* Replace printf with mbedtls_printf in the ARIA module. Found by
TrinityTonic in #1908.
* Fix potential use-after-free in mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len()
and mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() after a session reset. Fixes #1941.
* Fix a bug that caused SSL/TLS clients to incorrectly abort the handshake
with TLS versions 1.1 and earlier when the server requested authentication
without providing a list of CAs. This was due to an overly strict bounds
check in parsing the CertificateRequest message,
introduced in Mbed TLS 2.12.0. Fixes #1954.
* Fix a miscalculation of the maximum record expansion in
mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion() in case of ChachaPoly ciphersuites,
or CBC ciphersuites in (D)TLS versions 1.1 or higher. Fixes #1913, #1914.
* Fix undefined shifts with negative values in certificates parsing
(found by Catena cyber using oss-fuzz)
* Fix memory leak and free without initialization in pk_encrypt
and pk_decrypt example programs. Reported by Brace Stout. Fixes #1128.
* Remove redundant else statement. Raised by irwir. Fixes #1776.
Changes
* Copy headers preserving timestamps when doing a "make install".
Contributed by xueruini.
* Allow the forward declaration of public structs. Contributed by Dawid
Drozd. Fixes #1215 raised by randombit.
* Improve compatibility with some alternative CCM implementations by using
CCM test vectors from RAM.
* Add support for buffering of out-of-order handshake messages.
* Add warnings to the documentation of the HKDF module to reduce the risk
of misusing the mbedtls_hkdf_extract() and mbedtls_hkdf_expand()
functions. Fixes #1775. Reported by Brian J. Murray.
= mbed TLS 2.12.0 branch released 2018-07-25
Security

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@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
The mbed TLS library in Zephyr is a downstream of an externally maintained
open source project. The original upstream code can be found at:
https://tls.mbed.org/download/start/mbedtls-2.12.0-apache.tgz
https://tls.mbed.org/download/start/mbedtls-2.14.1-apache.tgz
One change was applied in the original code. In mbedTLS both files,
net_sockets.c and x509.c, were defining _POSIX_C_SOURCE and as Zephyr
build all files together this was raising and warning. In order to
fix this problem one define guard was added, as showed bellow:
One change was applied in the original code. In mbedTLS the file
net_sockets.c was defining _POSIX_C_SOURCE and as Zephyr build all files
together this was raising and warning. In order to fix this problem one
define guard was added, as showed bellow:
#if defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE)
#undef _POSIX_C_SOURCE
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L
#endif
At version 2.12.0
At version 2.14.1
The following is the license information for this code:

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@ -60,7 +60,11 @@
/* Error codes in range 0x0021-0x0025 */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0021 /**< Invalid input data. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0023 /**< Feature not available. For example, an unsupported AES key size. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0025 /**< AES hardware accelerator failed. */
#if ( defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER) ) && \
@ -79,7 +83,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief The AES context-type definition.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_aes_context
{
int nr; /*!< The number of rounds. */
uint32_t *rk; /*!< AES round keys. */
@ -98,7 +102,7 @@ mbedtls_aes_context;
/**
* \brief The AES XTS context-type definition.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_aes_xts_context
{
mbedtls_aes_context crypt; /*!< The AES context to use for AES block
encryption or decryption. */

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@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include <stddef.h>
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARC4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0019 /**< ARC4 hardware accelerator failed. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ extern "C" {
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead.
*
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_arc4_context
{
int x; /*!< permutation index */
int y; /*!< permutation index */

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@ -48,7 +48,12 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -0x005C /**< Invalid key length. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x005E /**< Invalid data input length. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be used.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x005A /**< Feature not available. For example, an unsupported ARIA key size. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0058 /**< ARIA hardware accelerator failed. */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT)
@ -62,7 +67,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief The ARIA context-type definition.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_aria_context
{
unsigned char nr; /*!< The number of rounds (12, 14 or 16) */
/*! The ARIA round keys. */

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@ -26,191 +26,272 @@
#include "asn1.h"
#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(g, f) do { if( ( ret = f ) < 0 ) return( ret ); else \
g += ret; } while( 0 )
#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(g, f) \
do { \
if( ( ret = f ) < 0 ) \
return( ret ); \
else \
g += ret; \
} while( 0 )
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/**
* \brief Write a length field in ASN.1 format
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write a length field in ASN.1 format.
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \param len the length to write
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param len The length value to write.
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, size_t len );
int mbedtls_asn1_write_len( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
size_t len );
/**
* \brief Write a ASN.1 tag in ASN.1 format
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write an ASN.1 tag in ASN.1 format.
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \param tag the tag to write
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param tag The tag to write.
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
unsigned char tag );
unsigned char tag );
/**
* \brief Write raw buffer data
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write raw buffer data.
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \param buf data buffer to write
* \param size length of the data buffer
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param buf The data buffer to write.
* \param size The length of the data buffer.
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t size );
const unsigned char *buf, size_t size );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
/**
* \brief Write a big number (MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) in ASN.1 format
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write a arbitrary-precision number (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)
* in ASN.1 format.
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \param X the MPI to write
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param X The MPI to write.
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X );
int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const mbedtls_mpi *X );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
/**
* \brief Write a NULL tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL) with zero data in ASN.1 format
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write a NULL tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL) with zero data
* in ASN.1 format.
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_null( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start );
/**
* \brief Write an OID tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) and data in ASN.1 format
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write an OID tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) and data
* in ASN.1 format.
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \param oid the OID to write
* \param oid_len length of the OID
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param oid The OID to write.
* \param oid_len The length of the OID.
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *oid, size_t oid_len );
const char *oid, size_t oid_len );
/**
* \brief Write an AlgorithmIdentifier sequence in ASN.1 format
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write an AlgorithmIdentifier sequence in ASN.1 format.
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \param oid the OID of the algorithm
* \param oid_len length of the OID
* \param par_len length of parameters, which must be already written.
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param oid The OID of the algorithm to write.
* \param oid_len The length of the algorithm's OID.
* \param par_len The length of the parameters, which must be already written.
* If 0, NULL parameters are added
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
size_t par_len );
int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier( unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *start,
const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
size_t par_len );
/**
* \brief Write a boolean tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) and value in ASN.1 format
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write a boolean tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) and value
* in ASN.1 format.
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \param boolean 0 or 1
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param boolean The boolean value to write, either \c 0 or \c 1.
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int boolean );
int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
int boolean );
/**
* \brief Write an int tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) and value in ASN.1 format
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write an int tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) and value
* in ASN.1 format.
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \param val the integer value
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param val The integer value to write.
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val );
/**
* \brief Write a printable string tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING) and
* value in ASN.1 format
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using a specific
* string encoding tag.
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \param text the text to write
* \param text_len length of the text
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param tag The string encoding tag to write, e.g.
* #MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING.
* \param text The string to write.
* \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might
* be strictly larger than the number of characters).
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *text, size_t text_len );
int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
int tag, const char *text,
size_t text_len );
/**
* \brief Write an IA5 string tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING) and
* value in ASN.1 format
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using the PrintableString
* string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING).
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \param text the text to write
* \param text_len length of the text
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param text The string to write.
* \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might
* be strictly larger than the number of characters).
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *start,
const char *text, size_t text_len );
/**
* \brief Write a UTF8 string in ASN.1 format using the UTF8String
* string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING).
*
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param text The string to write.
* \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might
* be strictly larger than the number of characters).
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *text, size_t text_len );
/**
* \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using the IA5String
* string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING).
*
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param text The string to write.
* \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might
* be strictly larger than the number of characters).
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *text, size_t text_len );
const char *text, size_t text_len );
/**
* \brief Write a bitstring tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and
* value in ASN.1 format
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write a bitstring tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and
* value in ASN.1 format.
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \param buf the bitstring
* \param bits the total number of bits in the bitstring
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param buf The bitstring to write.
* \param bits The total number of bits in the bitstring.
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits );
const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits );
/**
* \brief Write an octet string tag (MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) and
* value in ASN.1 format
* Note: function works backwards in data buffer
* \brief Write an octet string tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
* and value in ASN.1 format.
*
* \param p reference to current position pointer
* \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
* \param buf data buffer to write
* \param size length of the data buffer
* \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
*
* \return the length written or a negative error code
* \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
* \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
* \param buf The buffer holding the data to write.
* \param size The length of the data buffer \p buf.
*
* \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t size );
const unsigned char *buf, size_t size );
/**
* \brief Create or find a specific named_data entry for writing in a
@ -218,15 +299,16 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
* a new entry is added to the head of the list.
* Warning: Destructive behaviour for the val data!
*
* \param list Pointer to the location of the head of the list to seek
* through (will be updated in case of a new entry)
* \param oid The OID to look for
* \param oid_len Size of the OID
* \param val Data to store (can be NULL if you want to fill it by hand)
* \param val_len Minimum length of the data buffer needed
* \param list The pointer to the location of the head of the list to seek
* through (will be updated in case of a new entry).
* \param oid The OID to look for.
* \param oid_len The size of the OID.
* \param val The data to store (can be \c NULL if you want to fill
* it by hand).
* \param val_len The minimum length of the data buffer needed.
*
* \return NULL if if there was a memory allocation error, or a pointer
* to the new / existing entry.
* \return A pointer to the new / existing entry on success.
* \return \c NULL if if there was a memory allocation error.
*/
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **list,
const char *oid, size_t oid_len,

View file

@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief MPI structure
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_mpi
{
int s; /*!< integer sign */
size_t n; /*!< total # of limbs */
@ -725,8 +725,18 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated))
#else
#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
#endif
/**
* \brief Miller-Rabin primality test
* \brief Miller-Rabin primality test with error probability of
* 2<sup>-80</sup>
*
* \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext() which allows
* specifying the number of Miller-Rabin rounds.
*
* \param X MPI to check
* \param f_rng RNG function
@ -736,9 +746,48 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi
* MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if X is not prime
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
#undef MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
/**
* \brief Miller-Rabin primality test.
*
* \warning If \p X is potentially generated by an adversary, for example
* when validating cryptographic parameters that you didn't
* generate yourself and that are supposed to be prime, then
* \p rounds should be at least the half of the security
* strength of the cryptographic algorithm. On the other hand,
* if \p X is chosen uniformly or non-adversially (as is the
* case when mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime calls this function), then
* \p rounds can be much lower.
*
* \param X MPI to check
* \param rounds Number of bases to perform Miller-Rabin primality test for.
* The probability of returning 0 on a composite is at most
* 2<sup>-2*\p rounds</sup>.
* \param f_rng RNG function
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
* \return 0 if successful (probably prime),
* MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if X is not prime
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
/**
* \brief Flags for mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime()
*
* Each of these flags is a constraint on the result X returned by
* mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime().
*/
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH = 0x0001, /**< (X-1)/2 is prime too */
MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR = 0x0002, /**< lower error rate from 2<sup>-80</sup> to 2<sup>-128</sup> */
} mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime_flag_t;
/**
* \brief Prime number generation
@ -746,7 +795,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
* \param X Destination MPI
* \param nbits Required size of X in bits
* ( 3 <= nbits <= MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS )
* \param dh_flag If 1, then (X-1)/2 will be prime too
* \param flags Mask of flags of type #mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime_flag_t
* \param f_rng RNG function
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*
@ -754,7 +803,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if nbits is < 3
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag,
int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );

View file

@ -41,7 +41,11 @@
#define MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE 8 /* Blowfish uses 64 bit blocks */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -0x0016 /**< Invalid key length. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0017 /**< Blowfish hardware accelerator failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BLOWFISH_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0018 /**< Invalid data input length. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -55,7 +59,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief Blowfish context structure
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_blowfish_context
{
uint32_t P[MBEDTLS_BLOWFISH_ROUNDS + 2]; /*!< Blowfish round keys */
uint32_t S[4][256]; /*!< key dependent S-boxes */

View file

@ -565,9 +565,8 @@
#endif /* TriCore */
/*
* gcc -O0 by default uses r7 for the frame pointer, so it complains about our
* use of r7 below, unless -fomit-frame-pointer is passed. Unfortunately,
* passing that option is not easy when building with yotta.
* Note, gcc -O0 by default uses r7 for the frame pointer, so it complains about
* our use of r7 below, unless -fomit-frame-pointer is passed.
*
* On the other hand, -fomit-frame-pointer is implied by any -Ox options with
* x !=0, which we can detect using __OPTIMIZE__ (which is also defined by
@ -637,6 +636,23 @@
"r6", "r7", "r8", "r9", "cc" \
);
#elif defined (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP) && (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP == 1)
#define MULADDC_INIT \
asm(
#define MULADDC_CORE \
"ldr r0, [%0], #4 \n\t" \
"ldr r1, [%1] \n\t" \
"umaal r1, %2, %3, r0 \n\t" \
"str r1, [%1], #4 \n\t"
#define MULADDC_STOP \
: "=r" (s), "=r" (d), "=r" (c) \
: "r" (b), "0" (s), "1" (d), "2" (c) \
: "r0", "r1", "memory" \
);
#else
#define MULADDC_INIT \

View file

@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -0x0024 /**< Invalid key length. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0026 /**< Invalid data input length. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0027 /**< Camellia hardware accelerator failed. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -51,7 +54,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief CAMELLIA context structure
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_camellia_context
{
int nr; /*!< number of rounds */
uint32_t rk[68]; /*!< CAMELLIA round keys */

View file

@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -0x000D /**< Bad input parameters to the function. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x000F /**< Authenticated decryption failed. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0011 /**< CCM hardware accelerator failed. */
@ -68,7 +70,8 @@ extern "C" {
* \brief The CCM context-type definition. The CCM context is passed
* to the APIs called.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context
{
mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */
}
mbedtls_ccm_context;

View file

@ -43,7 +43,13 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0051 /**< Invalid input parameter(s). */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be
* used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0053 /**< Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0055 /**< Chacha20 hardware accelerator failed. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -52,7 +58,7 @@ extern "C" {
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT)
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_chacha20_context
{
uint32_t state[16]; /*! The state (before round operations). */
uint8_t keystream8[64]; /*! Leftover keystream bytes. */

View file

@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t;
#include "chacha20.h"
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_chachapoly_context
{
mbedtls_chacha20_context chacha20_ctx; /**< The ChaCha20 context. */
mbedtls_poly1305_context poly1305_ctx; /**< The Poly1305 context. */

View file

@ -108,6 +108,16 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) )
#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative ECP implementation"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif

View file

@ -45,7 +45,8 @@
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM
#endif
@ -61,6 +62,8 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED -0x6280 /**< Decryption of block requires a full block. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED -0x6300 /**< Authentication failed (for AEAD modes). */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT -0x6380 /**< The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x6400 /**< Cipher hardware accelerator failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN 0x01 /**< Cipher accepts IVs of variable length. */
@ -235,7 +238,8 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t mbedtls_cmac_context_t;
* Cipher information. Allows calling cipher functions
* in a generic way.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_info_t
{
/** Full cipher identifier. For example,
* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC.
*/
@ -276,7 +280,8 @@ typedef struct {
/**
* Generic cipher context.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_context_t
{
/** Information about the associated cipher. */
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;

View file

@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
extern "C" {
#endif
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CMAC_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x007A /**< CMAC hardware accelerator failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16

View file

@ -137,12 +137,21 @@
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
*
* System has time.h and time(), gmtime() and the clock is correct.
* System has time.h, time(), and an implementation for
* mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() (see below).
* The time needs to be correct (not necesarily very accurate, but at least
* the date should be correct). This is used to verify the validity period of
* X.509 certificates.
*
* Comment if your system does not have a correct clock.
*
* \note mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() is an abstraction in platform_util.h that
* behaves similarly to the gmtime_r() function from the C standard. Refer to
* the documentation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() for more information.
*
* \note It is possible to configure an implementation for
* mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() at compile-time by using the macro
* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
@ -668,6 +677,30 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
*
* Enable "non-blocking" ECC operations that can return early and be resumed.
*
* This allows various functions to pause by returning
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or, for functions in the SSL module,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) and then be called later again in
* order to further progress and eventually complete their operation. This is
* controlled through mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() which limits the maximum
* number of ECC operations a function may perform before pausing; see
* mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() for more information.
*
* This is useful in non-threaded environments if you want to avoid blocking
* for too long on ECC (and, hence, X.509 or SSL/TLS) operations.
*
* Uncomment this macro to enable restartable ECC computations.
*
* \note This option only works with the default software implementation of
* elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with
* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
*
@ -1279,7 +1312,7 @@
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION
*
* Disable support for TLS renegotiation.
* Enable support for TLS renegotiation.
*
* The two main uses of renegotiation are (1) refresh keys on long-lived
* connections and (2) client authentication after the initial handshake.
@ -2018,14 +2051,16 @@
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
*
* Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-256-based random generator.
* Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-based random generator.
* The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default.
* To use AES-128 instead, enable MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY below.
*
* Module: library/ctr_drbg.c
* Caller:
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C
*
* This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES-256 random number generator.
* This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
@ -2910,6 +2945,7 @@
//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */
//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */
//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */
//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY /**< Use 128-bit key for CTR_DRBG - may reduce security (see ctr_drbg.h) */
/* HMAC_DRBG options */
//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */
@ -3010,6 +3046,23 @@
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384
/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING
*
* Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of
* DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering.
*
* This should be at least 9/8 * MBEDTLSSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN
* to account for a reassembled handshake message of maximum size,
* together with its reassembly bitmap.
*
* A value of 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN (32768 by default)
* should be sufficient for all practical situations as it allows
* to reassembly a large handshake message (such as a certificate)
* while buffering multiple smaller handshake messages.
*
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768
//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEFAULT_TICKET_LIFETIME 86400 /**< Lifetime of session tickets (if enabled) */
//#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 bits) */
//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */
@ -3083,25 +3136,33 @@
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT
/**
* Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of
* mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(). This replaces the default implementation in
* platform_util.c.
*
* gmtime() is not a thread-safe function as defined in the C standard. The
* library will try to use safer implementations of this function, such as
* gmtime_r() when available. However, if Mbed TLS cannot identify the target
* system, the implementation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() will default to
* using the standard gmtime(). In this case, calls from the library to
* gmtime() will be guarded by the global mutex mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex
* if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. We recommend that calls from outside the
* library are also guarded with this mutex to avoid race conditions. However,
* if the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, Mbed TLS will
* unconditionally use the implementation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r()
* supplied at compile time.
*/
//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT
/* \} name SECTION: Customisation configuration options */
/* Target and application specific configurations */
//#define YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_TARGET_CONFIG_FILE "target_config.h"
#if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && defined(YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_TARGET_CONFIG_FILE)
#include YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_TARGET_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
/*
/* Target and application specific configurations
*
* Allow user to override any previous default.
*
* Use two macro names for that, as:
* - with yotta the prefix YOTTA_CFG_ is forced
* - without yotta is looks weird to have a YOTTA prefix.
*/
#if defined(YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
#include YOTTA_CFG_MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE
#endif

View file

@ -8,8 +8,11 @@
* Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random
* Bit Generators</em>.
*
* The Mbed TLS implementation of CTR_DRBG uses AES-256 as the underlying
* block cipher.
* The Mbed TLS implementation of CTR_DRBG uses AES-256 (default) or AES-128
* as the underlying block cipher.
*
* \warning Using 128-bit keys for CTR_DRBG limits the security of generated
* keys and operations that use random values generated to 128-bit security.
*/
/*
* Copyright (C) 2006-2018, Arm Limited (or its affiliates), All Rights Reserved
@ -45,7 +48,13 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x003A /**< Read or write error in file. */
#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE 16 /**< The block size used by the cipher. */
#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 32 /**< The key size used by the cipher. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY)
#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 16 /**< The key size used by the cipher (compile-time choice: 128 bits). */
#else
#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 32 /**< The key size used by the cipher (compile-time choice: 256 bits). */
#endif
#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 8 ) /**< The key size for the DRBG operation, in bits. */
#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN ( MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) /**< The seed length, calculated as (counter + AES key). */
@ -108,7 +117,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief The CTR_DRBG context structure.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context
{
unsigned char counter[16]; /*!< The counter (V). */
int reseed_counter; /*!< The reseed counter. */
@ -228,20 +237,41 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t len );
/**
* \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context.
* \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context.
*
* \note If \p add_len is greater than
* #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT, only the first
* #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT Bytes are used.
* The remaining Bytes are silently discarded.
* \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context.
* \param additional The data to update the state with.
* \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. This must be at
* most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT.
*
* \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context.
* \param additional The data to update the state with.
* \param add_len Length of \p additional data.
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if
* \p add_len is more than
* #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT.
* \return An error from the underlying AES cipher on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional,
size_t add_len );
/**
* \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context.
*
* \warning This function cannot report errors. You should use
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret() instead.
*
* \note If \p add_len is greater than
* #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT, only the first
* #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT Bytes are used.
* The remaining Bytes are silently discarded.
*
* \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context.
* \param additional The data to update the state with.
* \param add_len Length of \p additional data.
*/
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len );
const unsigned char *additional,
size_t add_len );
/**
* \brief This function updates a CTR_DRBG instance with additional

View file

@ -42,6 +42,8 @@
#define MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT 0
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0032 /**< The data input has an invalid length. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0033 /**< DES hardware accelerator failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE 8
@ -61,7 +63,7 @@ extern "C" {
* security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
* instead.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_des_context
{
uint32_t sk[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */
}
@ -70,7 +72,7 @@ mbedtls_des_context;
/**
* \brief Triple-DES context structure
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_des3_context
{
uint32_t sk[96]; /*!< 3DES subkeys */
}

View file

@ -84,7 +84,10 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT -0x3380 /**< The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3400 /**< Allocation of memory failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x3480 /**< Read or write of file failed. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3500 /**< DHM hardware accelerator failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED -0x3580 /**< Setting the modulus and generator failed. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -96,7 +99,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief The DHM context structure.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_dhm_context
{
size_t len; /*!< The size of \p P in Bytes. */
mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus. */

View file

@ -50,9 +50,13 @@ typedef enum
} mbedtls_ecdh_side;
/**
*
* \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same
* ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type
* should not be shared between multiple threads.
* \brief The ECDH context structure.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context
{
mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< The elliptic curve used. */
mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< The private key. */
@ -63,6 +67,10 @@ typedef struct
mbedtls_ecp_point Vi; /*!< The blinding value. */
mbedtls_ecp_point Vf; /*!< The unblinding value. */
mbedtls_mpi _d; /*!< The previous \p d. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
int restart_enabled; /*!< The flag for restartable mode. */
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx rs; /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */
#endif
}
mbedtls_ecdh_context;
@ -83,9 +91,8 @@ mbedtls_ecdh_context;
* \param p_rng The RNG context.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or
* \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or
* \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure.
*
*/
int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
@ -112,7 +119,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp
* \param p_rng The RNG context.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or
* \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or
* \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z,
@ -155,7 +162,9 @@ void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx );
* \param p_rng The RNG context.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
* operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
* \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
@ -197,7 +206,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
* 0: The key of the peer.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
* \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
*
*/
int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
@ -220,7 +229,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypai
* \param p_rng The RNG context.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
* operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
* \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
@ -266,13 +277,31 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
* \param p_rng The RNG context.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
* operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
* \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
* \brief This function enables restartable EC computations for this
* context. (Default: disabled.)
*
* \see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()
*
* \note It is not possible to safely disable restartable
* computations once enabled, except by free-ing the context,
* which cancels possible in-progress operations.
*
* \param ctx The ECDH context.
*/
void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -55,15 +55,65 @@
/** The maximal size of an ECDSA signature in Bytes. */
#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN ( 3 + 2 * ( 3 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ) )
/**
* \brief The ECDSA context structure.
*/
typedef mbedtls_ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_context;
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/**
* \brief The ECDSA context structure.
*
* \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same
* ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type
* should not be shared between multiple threads.
*/
typedef mbedtls_ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_context;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
* \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_verify()
*
* \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx;
/**
* \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_sign()
*
* \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
/**
* \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_sign_det()
*
* \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx;
#endif
/**
* \brief General context for resuming ECDSA operations
*/
typedef struct
{
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx ecp; /*!< base context for ECP restart and
shared administrative info */
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ver; /*!< ecdsa_verify() sub-context */
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *sig; /*!< ecdsa_sign() sub-context */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *det; /*!< ecdsa_sign_det() sub-context */
#endif
} mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx;
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */
typedef void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/**
* \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
* previously-hashed message.
@ -205,6 +255,40 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
/**
* \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it
* to a buffer, in a restartable way.
*
* \see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature()
*
* \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature()
* but it can return early and restart according to the limit
* set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
*
* \param ctx The ECDSA context.
* \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message.
* \param hash The message hash.
* \param hlen The length of the hash.
* \param sig The buffer that holds the signature.
* \param slen The length of the signature written.
* \param f_rng The RNG function.
* \param p_rng The RNG context.
* \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart).
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
* operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
* \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or
* \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
@ -288,6 +372,37 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen );
/**
* \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature,
* in a restartable way.
*
* \see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature()
*
* \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature()
* but it can return early and restart according to the limit
* set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
*
* \param ctx The ECDSA context.
* \param hash The message hash.
* \param hlen The size of the hash.
* \param sig The signature to read and verify.
* \param slen The size of \p sig.
* \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart).
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid
* signature in \p sig, but its length is less than \p siglen.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
* operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
* \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX
* error code on failure for any other reason.
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
/**
* \brief This function generates an ECDSA keypair on the given curve.
*
@ -332,6 +447,18 @@ void mbedtls_ecdsa_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx );
*/
void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
* \brief Initialize a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx );
/**
* \brief Free the components of a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ typedef enum {
* convetion from the Thread v1.0 spec. Correspondance is indicated in the
* description as a pair C: client name, S: server name
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_ecjpake_context
{
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; /**< Hash to use */
mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /**< Elliptic curve */

View file

@ -49,8 +49,12 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED -0x4D00 /**< Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY -0x4C80 /**< Invalid private or public key. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x4C00 /**< The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4B80 /**< The ECP hardware accelerator failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS -0x4B00 /**< Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -92,7 +96,7 @@ typedef enum
/**
* Curve information, for use by other modules.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_curve_info
{
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; /*!< An internal identifier. */
uint16_t tls_id; /*!< The TLS NamedCurve identifier. */
@ -111,7 +115,7 @@ typedef struct
* Otherwise, \p X and \p Y are its standard (affine)
* coordinates.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_point
{
mbedtls_mpi X; /*!< The X coordinate of the ECP point. */
mbedtls_mpi Y; /*!< The Y coordinate of the ECP point. */
@ -156,7 +160,7 @@ mbedtls_ecp_point;
* reduction. It must return 0 on success and non-zero on failure.
*
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group
{
mbedtls_ecp_group_id id; /*!< An internal group identifier. */
mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus of the base field. */
@ -181,6 +185,70 @@ typedef struct
}
mbedtls_ecp_group;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
* \brief Internal restart context for multiplication
*
* \note Opaque struct
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx;
/**
* \brief Internal restart context for ecp_muladd()
*
* \note Opaque struct
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx;
/**
* \brief General context for resuming ECC operations
*/
typedef struct
{
unsigned ops_done; /*!< current ops count */
unsigned depth; /*!< call depth (0 = top-level) */
mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *rsm; /*!< ecp_mul_comb() sub-context */
mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ma; /*!< ecp_muladd() sub-context */
} mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx;
/*
* Operation counts for restartable functions
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK 3 /*!< basic ops count for ecp_check_pubkey() */
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL 8 /*!< basic ops count for ecp_double_jac() */
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD 11 /*!< basic ops count for see ecp_add_mixed() */
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV 120 /*!< empirical equivalent for mpi_mod_inv() */
/**
* \brief Internal; for restartable functions in other modules.
* Check and update basic ops budget.
*
* \param grp Group structure
* \param rs_ctx Restart context
* \param ops Number of basic ops to do
*
* \return \c 0 if doing \p ops basic ops is still allowed,
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise.
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx,
unsigned ops );
/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ops ) \
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( grp, rs_ctx, \
(unsigned) (ops) ) );
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET( ops ) /* no-op; for compatibility */
/* We want to declare restartable versions of existing functions anyway */
typedef void mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/**
* \name SECTION: Module settings
*
@ -251,7 +319,7 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group;
* \note Members are deliberately in the same order as in the
* ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context structure.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_keypair
{
mbedtls_ecp_group grp; /*!< Elliptic curve and base point */
mbedtls_mpi d; /*!< our secret value */
@ -270,6 +338,75 @@ mbedtls_ecp_keypair;
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE 3 /**< The named_curve of ECCurveType. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
* \brief Set the maximum number of basic operations done in a row.
*
* If more operations are needed to complete a computation,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS will be returned by the
* function performing the computation. It is then the
* caller's responsibility to either call again with the same
* parameters until it returns 0 or an error code; or to free
* the restart context if the operation is to be aborted.
*
* It is strictly required that all input parameters and the
* restart context be the same on successive calls for the
* same operation, but output parameters need not be the
* same; they must not be used until the function finally
* returns 0.
*
* This only applies to functions whose documentation
* mentions they may return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS for functions in the
* SSL module). For functions that accept a "restart context"
* argument, passing NULL disables restart and makes the
* function equivalent to the function with the same name
* with \c _restartable removed. For functions in the ECDH
* module, restart is disabled unless the function accepts
* an "ECDH context" argument and
* mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart() was previously called on
* that context. For function in the SSL module, restart is
* only enabled for specific sides and key exchanges
* (currently only for clients and ECDHE-ECDSA).
*
* \param max_ops Maximum number of basic operations done in a row.
* Default: 0 (unlimited).
* Lower (non-zero) values mean ECC functions will block for
* a lesser maximum amount of time.
*
* \note A "basic operation" is defined as a rough equivalent of a
* multiplication in GF(p) for the NIST P-256 curve.
* As an indication, with default settings, a scalar
* multiplication (full run of \c mbedtls_ecp_mul()) is:
* - about 3300 basic operations for P-256
* - about 9400 basic operations for P-384
*
* \note Very low values are not always respected: sometimes
* functions need to block for a minimum number of
* operations, and will do so even if max_ops is set to a
* lower value. That minimum depends on the curve size, and
* can be made lower by decreasing the value of
* \c MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE. As an indication, here is the
* lowest effective value for various curves and values of
* that parameter (w for short):
* w=6 w=5 w=4 w=3 w=2
* P-256 208 208 160 136 124
* P-384 682 416 320 272 248
* P-521 1364 832 640 544 496
*
* \note This setting is currently ignored by Curve25519.
*/
void mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops( unsigned max_ops );
/**
* \brief Check if restart is enabled (max_ops != 0)
*
* \return \c 0 if \c max_ops == 0 (restart disabled)
* \return \c 1 otherwise (restart enabled)
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled( void );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/**
* \brief This function retrieves the information defined in
* mbedtls_ecp_curve_info() for all supported curves in order
@ -366,6 +503,18 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_group_free( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp );
*/
void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
* \brief Initialize a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx );
/**
* \brief Free the components of a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/**
* \brief This function copies the contents of point \p Q into
* point \p P.
@ -597,6 +746,36 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_mul( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng );
/**
* \brief This function performs multiplication of a point by
* an integer: \p R = \p m * \p P in a restartable way.
*
* \see mbedtls_ecp_mul()
*
* \note This function does the same as \c mbedtls_ecp_mul(), but
* it can return early and restart according to the limit set
* with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
*
* \param grp The ECP group.
* \param R The destination point.
* \param m The integer by which to multiply.
* \param P The point to multiply.
* \param f_rng The RNG function.
* \param p_rng The RNG context.
* \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart).
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private
* key, or \p P is not a valid public key.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
* operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
/**
* \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two
* points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q
@ -623,6 +802,39 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_muladd( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q );
/**
* \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two
* points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q in a
* restartable way.
*
* \see \c mbedtls_ecp_muladd()
*
* \note This function works the same as \c mbedtls_ecp_muladd(),
* but it can return early and restart according to the limit
* set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
*
* \param grp The ECP group.
* \param R The destination point.
* \param m The integer by which to multiply \p P.
* \param P The point to multiply by \p m.
* \param n The integer by which to multiply \p Q.
* \param Q The point to be multiplied by \p n.
* \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart).
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m or \p n are not
* valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public
* keys.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
* operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable(
mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
/**
* \brief This function checks that a point is a valid public key
* on this curve.
@ -665,6 +877,23 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_po
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_mpi *d );
/**
* \brief This function generates a private key.
*
* \param grp The ECP group.
* \param d The destination MPI (secret part).
* \param f_rng The RNG function.
* \param p_rng The RNG parameter.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code
* on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *d,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
/**
* \brief This function generates a keypair with a configurable base
* point.

View file

@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ typedef int (*mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr)(void *data, unsigned char *output, s
/**
* \brief Entropy source state
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_source_state
{
mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source; /**< The entropy source callback */
void * p_source; /**< The callback data pointer */
@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ mbedtls_entropy_source_state;
/**
* \brief Entropy context structure
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_context
{
int accumulator_started;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR)

View file

@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
* CHACHA20 3 0x0051-0x0055
* POLY1305 3 0x0057-0x005B
* CHACHAPOLY 2 0x0054-0x0056
* PLATFORM 1 0x0070-0x0072
*
* High-level module nr (3 bits - 0x0...-0x7...)
* Name ID Nr of Errors
@ -90,12 +91,12 @@
* DHM 3 11
* PK 3 15 (Started from top)
* RSA 4 11
* ECP 4 9 (Started from top)
* ECP 4 10 (Started from top)
* MD 5 5
* HKDF 5 1 (Started from top)
* CIPHER 6 8
* SSL 6 22 (Started from top)
* SSL 7 31
* SSL 6 23 (Started from top)
* SSL 7 32
*
* Module dependent error code (5 bits 0x.00.-0x.F8.)
*/

View file

@ -41,7 +41,10 @@
#define MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT 0
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x0012 /**< Authenticated decryption failed. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0013 /**< GCM hardware accelerator failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT -0x0014 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -53,7 +56,8 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief The GCM context structure.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct mbedtls_gcm_context
{
mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx; /*!< The cipher context used. */
uint64_t HL[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable low. */
uint64_t HH[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable high. */
@ -145,9 +149,9 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
* \return \c 0 if the encryption or decryption was performed
* successfully. Note that in #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT mode,
* this does not indicate that the data is authentic.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths are not valid.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED or a cipher-specific
* error code if the encryption or decryption failed.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths are not valid or
* a cipher-specific error code if the encryption
* or decryption failed.
*/
int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
int mode,
@ -184,9 +188,8 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
*
* \return \c 0 if successful and authenticated.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths are not valid.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED or a cipher-specific
* error code if the decryption failed.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths are not valid or
* a cipher-specific error code if the decryption failed.
*/
int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
size_t length,

View file

@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief HAVEGE state structure
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_havege_state
{
int PT1, PT2, offset[2];
int pool[MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_COLLECT_SIZE];

View file

@ -73,6 +73,11 @@ int mbedtls_hkdf( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *salt,
* \brief Take the input keying material \p ikm and extract from it a
* fixed-length pseudorandom key \p prk.
*
* \warning This function should only be used if the security of it has been
* studied and established in that particular context (eg. TLS 1.3
* key schedule). For standard HKDF security guarantees use
* \c mbedtls_hkdf instead.
*
* \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the
* hash function output in bytes.
* \param salt An optional salt value (a non-secret random value);
@ -97,10 +102,15 @@ int mbedtls_hkdf_extract( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md,
* \brief Expand the supplied \p prk into several additional pseudorandom
* keys, which is the output of the HKDF.
*
* \warning This function should only be used if the security of it has been
* studied and established in that particular context (eg. TLS 1.3
* key schedule). For standard HKDF security guarantees use
* \c mbedtls_hkdf instead.
*
* \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the hash
* function output in bytes.
* \param prk A pseudorandom key of at least md.size bytes. \p prk is usually,
* the output from the HKDF extract step.
* \param prk A pseudorandom key of at least md.size bytes. \p prk is
* usually the output from the HKDF extract step.
* \param prk_len The length in bytes of \p prk.
* \param info An optional context and application specific information
* string. This can be a zero-length string.

View file

@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* HMAC_DRBG context.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context
{
/* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitely,
* but is implied by the HMAC context */
@ -195,11 +195,31 @@ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
* \param additional Additional data to update state with, or NULL
* \param add_len Length of additional data, or 0
*
* \return \c 0 on success, or an error from the underlying
* hash calculation.
*
* \note Additional data is optional, pass NULL and 0 as second
* third argument if no additional data is being used.
*/
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len );
/**
* \brief HMAC_DRBG update state
*
* \warning This function cannot report errors. You should use
* mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret() instead.
*
* \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context
* \param additional Additional data to update state with, or NULL
* \param add_len Length of additional data, or 0
*
* \note Additional data is optional, pass NULL and 0 as second
* third argument if no additional data is being used.
*/
void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len );
const unsigned char *additional,
size_t add_len );
/**
* \brief HMAC_DRBG reseeding (extracts data from entropy source)

View file

@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5100 /**< Bad input parameters to function. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED -0x5180 /**< Failed to allocate memory. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x5200 /**< Opening or reading of file failed. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x5280 /**< MD hardware accelerator failed. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -80,7 +82,8 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t;
/**
* The generic message-digest context.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct mbedtls_md_context_t
{
/** Information about the associated message digest. */
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;

View file

@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <stddef.h>
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD2_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002B /**< MD2 hardware accelerator failed */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ extern "C" {
* stronger message digests instead.
*
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_md2_context
{
unsigned char cksum[16]; /*!< checksum of the data block */
unsigned char state[48]; /*!< intermediate digest state */

View file

@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD4_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002D /**< MD4 hardware accelerator failed */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -56,7 +57,7 @@ extern "C" {
* stronger message digests instead.
*
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_md4_context
{
uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */
uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */

View file

@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD5_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x002F /**< MD5 hardware accelerator failed */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ extern "C" {
* stronger message digests instead.
*
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_md5_context
{
uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */
uint32_t state[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */

View file

@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ extern "C" {
* (eg two file descriptors for combined IPv4 + IPv6 support, or additional
* structures for hand-made UDP demultiplexing).
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_net_context
{
int fd; /**< The underlying file descriptor */
}

View file

@ -403,7 +403,8 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief Base OID descriptor structure
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t
{
const char *asn1; /*!< OID ASN.1 representation */
size_t asn1_len; /*!< length of asn1 */
const char *name; /*!< official name (e.g. from RFC) */

View file

@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief PEM context structure
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_pem_context
{
unsigned char *buf; /*!< buffer for decoded data */
size_t buflen; /*!< length of the buffer */

View file

@ -64,6 +64,8 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE -0x3A00 /**< Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported). */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x3980 /**< Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x3900 /**< The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x3880 /**< PK hardware accelerator failed. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ typedef enum {
* \brief Options for RSASSA-PSS signature verification.
* See \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext()
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options
{
mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id;
int expected_salt_len;
@ -107,7 +109,7 @@ typedef enum
/**
* \brief Item to send to the debug module
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_pk_debug_item
{
mbedtls_pk_debug_type type;
const char *name;
@ -125,12 +127,26 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t;
/**
* \brief Public key container
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context
{
const mbedtls_pk_info_t * pk_info; /**< Public key informations */
const mbedtls_pk_info_t * pk_info; /**< Public key information */
void * pk_ctx; /**< Underlying public key context */
} mbedtls_pk_context;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
* \brief Context for resuming operations
*/
typedef struct
{
const mbedtls_pk_info_t * pk_info; /**< Public key information */
void * rs_ctx; /**< Underlying restart context */
} mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx;
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */
typedef void mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
/**
* Quick access to an RSA context inside a PK context.
@ -190,6 +206,18 @@ void mbedtls_pk_init( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx );
*/
void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
* \brief Initialize a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_pk_restart_init( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx );
/**
* \brief Free the components of a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_pk_restart_free( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/**
* \brief Initialize a PK context with the information given
* and allocates the type-specific PK subcontext.
@ -286,6 +314,32 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len );
/**
* \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_verify()
*
* \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_pk_verify(), but can
* return early and restart according to the limit set with
* \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC
* operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_verify().
*
* \param ctx PK context to use
* \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes)
* \param hash Hash of the message to sign
* \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes)
* \param sig Signature to verify
* \param sig_len Signature length
* \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart)
*
* \return See \c mbedtls_pk_verify(), or
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
* operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
*/
int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
/**
* \brief Verify signature, with options.
* (Includes verification of the padding depending on type.)
@ -349,6 +403,35 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng );
/**
* \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_sign()
*
* \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_pk_sign(), but can
* return early and restart according to the limit set with
* \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC
* operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_sign().
*
* \param ctx PK context to use - must hold a private key
* \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes)
* \param hash Hash of the message to sign
* \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes)
* \param sig Place to write the signature
* \param sig_len Number of bytes written
* \param f_rng RNG function
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
* \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart)
*
* \return See \c mbedtls_pk_sign(), or
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
* operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
*/
int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
/**
* \brief Decrypt message (including padding if relevant).
*

View file

@ -59,6 +59,21 @@ struct mbedtls_pk_info_t
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/** Verify signature (restartable) */
int (*verify_rs_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
void *rs_ctx );
/** Make signature (restartable) */
int (*sign_rs_func)( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/** Decrypt message */
int (*decrypt_func)( void *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
@ -80,6 +95,14 @@ struct mbedtls_pk_info_t
/** Free the given context */
void (*ctx_free_func)( void *ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/** Allocate the restart context */
void * (*rs_alloc_func)( void );
/** Free the restart context */
void (*rs_free_func)( void *rs_ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/** Interface with the debug module */
void (*debug_func)( const void *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items );

View file

@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* Context for PKCS #11 private keys.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs11_context
{
pkcs11h_certificate_t pkcs11h_cert;
int len;
} mbedtls_pkcs11_context;

View file

@ -43,6 +43,9 @@
#include "platform_time.h"
#endif
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0070 /**< Hardware accelerator failed */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -0x0072 /**< The requested feature is not supported by the platform */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -315,7 +318,8 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed(
* \note This structure may be used to assist platform-specific
* setup or teardown operations.
*/
typedef struct {
typedef struct mbedtls_platform_context
{
char dummy; /**< A placeholder member, as empty structs are not portable. */
}
mbedtls_platform_context;

View file

@ -25,7 +25,17 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
#endif
#include <stddef.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
#include <time.h>
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
@ -55,6 +65,37 @@ extern "C" {
*/
void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
/**
* \brief Platform-specific implementation of gmtime_r()
*
* The function is a thread-safe abstraction that behaves
* similarly to the gmtime_r() function from Unix/POSIX.
*
* Mbed TLS will try to identify the underlying platform and
* make use of an appropriate underlying implementation (e.g.
* gmtime_r() for POSIX and gmtime_s() for Windows). If this is
* not possible, then gmtime() will be used. In this case, calls
* from the library to gmtime() will be guarded by the mutex
* mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is
* enabled. It is recommended that calls from outside the library
* are also guarded by this mutex.
*
* If MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, then Mbed TLS will
* unconditionally use the alternative implementation for
* mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() supplied by the user at compile time.
*
* \param tt Pointer to an object containing time (in seconds) since the
* epoch to be converted
* \param tm_buf Pointer to an object where the results will be stored
*
* \return Pointer to an object of type struct tm on success, otherwise
* NULL
*/
struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( const mbedtls_time_t *tt,
struct tm *tm_buf );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

View file

@ -43,7 +43,13 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0057 /**< Invalid input parameter(s). */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be
* used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x0059 /**< Feature not available. For example, s part of the API is not implemented. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x005B /**< Poly1305 hardware accelerator failed. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -52,7 +58,7 @@ extern "C" {
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT)
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_poly1305_context
{
uint32_t r[4]; /** The value for 'r' (low 128 bits of the key). */
uint32_t s[4]; /** The value for 's' (high 128 bits of the key). */

View file

@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RIPEMD160_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0031 /**< RIPEMD160 hardware accelerator failed */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -46,7 +48,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief RIPEMD-160 context structure
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_ripemd160_context
{
uint32_t total[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */
uint32_t state[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */

View file

@ -55,7 +55,12 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED -0x4380 /**< The PKCS#1 verification failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE -0x4400 /**< The output buffer for decryption is not large enough. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED -0x4480 /**< The random generator failed to generate non-zeros. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION is deprecated and should not be used.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION -0x4500 /**< The implementation does not offer the requested operation, for example, because of security violations or lack of functionality. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x4580 /**< RSA hardware accelerator failed. */
/*
@ -92,7 +97,7 @@ extern "C" {
* is deprecated. All manipulation should instead be done through
* the public interface functions.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_rsa_context
{
int ver; /*!< Always 0.*/
size_t len; /*!< The size of \p N in Bytes. */
@ -281,7 +286,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx );
* zero Bytes.
*
* Possible reasons for returning
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION:<ul>
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:<ul>
* <li>An alternative RSA implementation is in use, which
* stores the key externally, and either cannot or should
* not export it into RAM.</li>
@ -301,7 +306,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx );
* \param E The MPI to hold the public exponent, or NULL.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION if exporting the
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED if exporting the
* requested parameters cannot be done due to missing
* functionality or because of security policies.
* \return A non-zero return code on any other failure.
@ -321,7 +326,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* zero Bytes.
*
* Possible reasons for returning
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION:<ul>
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:<ul>
* <li>An alternative RSA implementation is in use, which
* stores the key externally, and either cannot or should
* not export it into RAM.</li>
@ -350,7 +355,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \param E_len The size of the buffer for the public exponent.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION if exporting the
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED if exporting the
* requested parameters cannot be done due to missing
* functionality or because of security policies.
* \return A non-zero return code on any other failure.
@ -563,7 +568,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The RSA context.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. Needed for padding, PKCS#1 v2.1
@ -598,7 +603,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The RSA context.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. Needed for padding and
@ -633,7 +638,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The RSA context.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. Needed for padding and PKCS#1 v2.1
@ -682,7 +687,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The RSA context.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
@ -725,7 +730,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The RSA context.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
@ -770,7 +775,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The RSA context.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
@ -817,7 +822,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The RSA context.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. Needed for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding and for
@ -856,7 +861,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The RSA context.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
@ -894,6 +899,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* Specifications</em> it is advised to keep both hashes the
* same.
*
* \note This function always uses the maximum possible salt size,
* up to the length of the payload hash. This choice of salt
* size complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 (PKCS#1
* v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. Furthermore this function enforces a
* minimum salt size which is the hash size minus 2 bytes. If
* this minimum size is too large given the key size (the salt
* size, plus the hash size, plus 2 bytes must be no more than
* the key size in bytes), this function returns
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
*
* \deprecated It is deprecated and discouraged to call this function
* in #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC mode. Future versions of the library
* are likely to remove the \p mode argument and have it
@ -901,7 +916,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The RSA context.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. Needed for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding and for
@ -947,7 +962,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The RSA public key context.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
@ -985,7 +1000,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The RSA public key context.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.
@ -1034,7 +1049,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
*
* \note Alternative implementations of RSA need not support
* mode being set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE and might instead
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION.
* return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param ctx The RSA public key context.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. Only needed for #MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE.

View file

@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0035 /**< SHA-1 hardware accelerator failed */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ extern "C" {
* stronger message digests instead.
*
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_sha1_context
{
uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */
uint32_t state[5]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */

View file

@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0037 /**< SHA-256 hardware accelerator failed */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -53,7 +54,7 @@ extern "C" {
* checksum calculations. The choice between these two is
* made in the call to mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret().
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_sha256_context
{
uint32_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */
uint32_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */

View file

@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0039 /**< SHA-512 hardware accelerator failed */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -52,7 +53,7 @@ extern "C" {
* checksum calculations. The choice between these two is
* made in the call to mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret().
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_sha512_context
{
uint64_t total[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */
uint64_t state[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */

View file

@ -121,6 +121,8 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_VERIFY_HASH -0x6600 /**< Couldn't set the hash for verifying CertificateVerify */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING -0x6580 /**< Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS -0x6500 /**< The asynchronous operation is not completed yet. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE -0x6480 /**< Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS -0x7000 /**< A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later. */
/*
* Various constants
@ -242,6 +244,14 @@
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN
#endif
/*
* Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of
* DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering.
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768
#endif
/* \} name SECTION: Module settings */
/*
@ -1022,14 +1032,14 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context
int renego_records_seen; /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS,
number of retransmissions of request if
renego_max_records is < 0 */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
int major_ver; /*!< equal to MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 */
int minor_ver; /*!< either 0 (SSL3) or 1 (TLS1.0) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT)
unsigned badmac_seen; /*!< records with a bad MAC received */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */
mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send; /*!< Callback for network send */
mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv; /*!< Callback for network receive */
@ -1085,11 +1095,11 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context
uint16_t in_epoch; /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */
size_t next_record_offset; /*!< offset of the next record in datagram
(equal to in_left if none) */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
uint64_t in_window_top; /*!< last validated record seq_num */
uint64_t in_window; /*!< bitmask for replay detection */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
size_t in_hslen; /*!< current handshake message length,
including the handshake header */
@ -1098,6 +1108,11 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context
int keep_current_message; /*!< drop or reuse current message
on next call to record layer? */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
uint8_t disable_datagram_packing; /*!< Disable packing multiple records
* within a single datagram. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/*
* Record layer (outgoing data)
*/
@ -1112,12 +1127,18 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context
size_t out_msglen; /*!< record header: message length */
size_t out_left; /*!< amount of data not yet written */
unsigned char cur_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
uint16_t mtu; /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
unsigned char *compress_buf; /*!< zlib data buffer */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING)
signed char split_done; /*!< current record already splitted? */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING */
/*
* PKI layer
@ -1130,11 +1151,11 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
char *hostname; /*!< expected peer CN for verification
(and SNI if available) */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
const char *alpn_chosen; /*!< negotiated protocol */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
/*
* Information for DTLS hello verify
@ -1142,7 +1163,7 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
unsigned char *cli_id; /*!< transport-level ID of the client */
size_t cli_id_len; /*!< length of cli_id */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
/*
* Secure renegotiation
@ -1154,7 +1175,7 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context
size_t verify_data_len; /*!< length of verify data stored */
char own_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */
char peer_verify_data[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL)
@ -1374,6 +1395,52 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv,
mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/**
* \brief Set the Maximum Tranport Unit (MTU).
* Special value: 0 means unset (no limit).
* This represents the maximum size of a datagram payload
* handled by the transport layer (usually UDP) as determined
* by the network link and stack. In practice, this controls
* the maximum size datagram the DTLS layer will pass to the
* \c f_send() callback set using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio().
*
* \note The limit on datagram size is converted to a limit on
* record payload by subtracting the current overhead of
* encapsulation and encryption/authentication if any.
*
* \note This can be called at any point during the connection, for
* example when a Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU)
* estimate becomes available from other sources,
* such as lower (or higher) protocol layers.
*
* \note This setting only controls the size of the packets we send,
* and does not restrict the size of the datagrams we're
* willing to receive. Client-side, you can request the
* server to use smaller records with \c
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len().
*
* \note If both a MTU and a maximum fragment length have been
* configured (or negotiated with the peer), the resulting
* lower limit on record payload (see first note) is used.
*
* \note This can only be used to decrease the maximum size
* of datagrams (hence records, see first note) sent. It
* cannot be used to increase the maximum size of records over
* the limit set by #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN.
*
* \note Values lower than the current record layer expansion will
* result in an error when trying to send data.
*
* \note Using record compression together with a non-zero MTU value
* will result in an error when trying to send data.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param mtu Value of the path MTU in bytes
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/**
* \brief Set the timeout period for mbedtls_ssl_read()
* (Default: no timeout.)
@ -1757,6 +1824,38 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limi
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_BADMAC_LIMIT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/**
* \brief Allow or disallow packing of multiple handshake records
* within a single datagram.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to configure.
* \param allow_packing This determines whether datagram packing may
* be used or not. A value of \c 0 means that every
* record will be sent in a separate datagram; a
* value of \c 1 means that, if space permits,
* multiple handshake messages (including CCS) belonging to
* a single flight may be packed within a single datagram.
*
* \note This is enabled by default and should only be disabled
* for test purposes, or if datagram packing causes
* interoperability issues with peers that don't support it.
*
* \note Allowing datagram packing reduces the network load since
* there's less overhead if multiple messages share the same
* datagram. Also, it increases the handshake efficiency
* since messages belonging to a single datagram will not
* be reordered in transit, and so future message buffering
* or flight retransmission (if no buffering is used) as
* means to deal with reordering are needed less frequently.
*
* \note Application records are not affected by this option and
* are currently always sent in separate datagrams.
*
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned allow_packing );
/**
* \brief Set retransmit timeout values for the DTLS handshake.
* (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.)
@ -2433,6 +2532,18 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
* (Client: set maximum fragment length to emit *and*
* negotiate with the server during handshake)
*
* \note With TLS, this currently only affects ApplicationData (sent
* with \c mbedtls_ssl_read()), not handshake messages.
* With DTLS, this affects both ApplicationData and handshake.
*
* \note This sets the maximum length for a record's payload,
* excluding record overhead that will be added to it, see
* \c mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion().
*
* \note For DTLS, it is also possible to set a limit for the total
* size of daragrams passed to the transport layer, including
* record overhead, see \c mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu().
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param mfl_code Code for maximum fragment length (allowed values:
* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024,
@ -2663,13 +2774,14 @@ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
/**
* \brief Return the result of the certificate verification
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param ssl The SSL context to use.
*
* \return 0 if successful,
* -1 if result is not available (eg because the handshake was
* aborted too early), or
* a combination of BADCERT_xxx and BADCRL_xxx flags, see
* x509.h
* \return \c 0 if the certificate verification was successful.
* \return \c -1u if the result is not available. This may happen
* e.g. if the handshake aborts early, or a verification
* callback returned a fatal error.
* \return A bitwise combination of \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX
* and \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX failure flags; see x509.h.
*/
uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
@ -2695,6 +2807,9 @@ const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
* \brief Return the (maximum) number of bytes added by the record
* layer: header + encryption/MAC overhead (inc. padding)
*
* \note This function is not available (always returns an error)
* when record compression is enabled.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes, or
@ -2709,12 +2824,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
* This is the value negotiated with peer if any,
* or the locally configured value.
*
* \note With DTLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will return an error if
* called with a larger length value.
* With TLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will fragment the input if
* necessary and return the number of bytes written; it is up
* to the caller to call \c mbedtls_ssl_write() again in
* order to send the remaining bytes if any.
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len()
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_record_payload()
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
@ -2723,6 +2834,34 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
/**
* \brief Return the current maximum outgoing record payload in bytes.
* This takes into account the config.h setting \c
* MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, the configured and negotiated
* max fragment length extension if used, and for DTLS the
* path MTU as configured and current record expansion.
*
* \note With DTLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will return an error if
* called with a larger length value.
* With TLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will fragment the input if
* necessary and return the number of bytes written; it is up
* to the caller to call \c mbedtls_ssl_write() again in
* order to send the remaining bytes if any.
*
* \note This function is not available (always returns an error)
* when record compression is enabled.
*
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu()
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len()
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion()
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return Current maximum payload for an outgoing record,
* or a negative error code.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/**
* \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection
@ -2776,35 +2915,50 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ssl_session
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return 0 if successful, or
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, or
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED (see below), or
* a specific SSL error code.
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
* if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to
* be available for reading from or writing to the underlying
* transport - in this case you must call this function again
* when the underlying transport is ready for the operation.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous
* operation is in progress (see
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you
* must call this function again when the operation is ready.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic
* operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
* in this case you must call this function again to complete
* the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use
* and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in
* this case you must stop using the context (see below).
* \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
* the context (see below).
*
* If this function returns MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, the
* handshake is unfinished and no further data is available
* from the underlying transport. In this case, you must call
* the function again at some later stage.
* \warning If this function returns something other than
* \c 0,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS,
* you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
* and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
* on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
* connection must be closed.
*
* \note If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED specially for logging
* purposes, as it is an expected return value rather than an
* actual error, but you still need to reset/free the context.
*
* \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS:
* If the function returns MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram
* If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram
* from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed,
* and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport
* signal a new event. This is not true for a successful handshake,
* in which case the datagram of the underlying transport that is
* currently being processed might or might not contain further
* DTLS records.
*
* \note If this function returns something other than 0 or
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using
* the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or
* call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it
* for a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
*
* \note If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED specially for logging
* purposes, as it is an expected return value rather than an
* actual error, but you still need to reset/free the context.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
@ -2812,20 +2966,21 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
* \brief Perform a single step of the SSL handshake
*
* \note The state of the context (ssl->state) will be at
* the next state after execution of this function. Do not
* the next state after this function returns \c 0. Do not
* call this function if state is MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER.
*
* \note If this function returns something other than 0 or
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using
* the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or
* call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it
* for a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return 0 if successful, or
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, or
* a specific SSL error code.
* \return See mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
*
* \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using
* the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it
* or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before
* re-using it for a new connection; the current connection
* must be closed.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
@ -2840,13 +2995,18 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return 0 if successful, or any mbedtls_ssl_handshake() return
* value.
* value except #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT that can't
* happen during a renegotiation.
*
* \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using
* the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it
* or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before
* re-using it for a new connection; the current connection
* must be closed.
*
* \note If this function returns something other than 0 or
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using
* the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or
* call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it
* for a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
@ -2858,42 +3018,56 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
* \param buf buffer that will hold the data
* \param len maximum number of bytes to read
*
* \return One of the following:
* - 0 if the read end of the underlying transport was closed,
* - the (positive) number of bytes read, or
* - a negative error code on failure.
* \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful.
* \return \c 0 if the read end of the underlying transport was closed
* - in this case you must stop using the context (see below).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
* if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to
* be available for reading from or writing to the underlying
* transport - in this case you must call this function again
* when the underlying transport is ready for the operation.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous
* operation is in progress (see
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you
* must call this function again when the operation is ready.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic
* operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
* in this case you must call this function again to complete
* the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server
* side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a
* new connection using the same source port. See below.
* \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
* the context (see below).
*
* If MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ is returned, no application data
* is available from the underlying transport. In this case,
* the function needs to be called again at some later stage.
* \warning If this function returns something other than
* a positive value,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT,
* you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
* and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
* on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
* connection must be closed.
*
* If MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE is returned, a write is pending
* but the underlying transport isn't available for writing. In this
* case, the function needs to be called again at some later stage.
*
* When this function return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT
* \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT
* (which can only happen server-side), it means that a client
* is initiating a new connection using the same source port.
* You can either treat that as a connection close and wait
* for the client to resend a ClientHello, or directly
* continue with \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the same
* context (as it has beeen reset internally). Either way, you
* should make sure this is seen by the application as a new
* context (as it has been reset internally). Either way, you
* must make sure this is seen by the application as a new
* connection: application state, if any, should be reset, and
* most importantly the identity of the client must be checked
* again. WARNING: not validating the identity of the client
* again, or not transmitting the new identity to the
* application layer, would allow authentication bypass!
*
* \note If this function returns something other than a positive value
* or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT,
* you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
* and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it
* before re-using it for a new connection; the current connection
* must be closed.
*
* \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS:
* - If the function returns MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram
* - If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram
* from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed,
* and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport
* signal a new event.
@ -2922,21 +3096,39 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
* \param buf buffer holding the data
* \param len how many bytes must be written
*
* \return the number of bytes actually written (may be less than len),
* or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
* or another negative error code.
* \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if
* successful (may be less than \p len).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
* if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to
* be available for reading from or writing to the underlying
* transport - in this case you must call this function again
* when the underlying transport is ready for the operation.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous
* operation is in progress (see
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you
* must call this function again when the operation is ready.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic
* operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
* in this case you must call this function again to complete
* the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
* \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
* the context (see below).
*
* \note If this function returns something other than 0, a positive
* value or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop
* using the SSL context for reading or writing, and either
* free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before
* re-using it for a new connection; the current connection
* must be closed.
* \warning If this function returns something other than
* a non-negative value,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS,
* you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
* and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
* on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
* connection must be closed.
*
* \note When this function returns MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ,
* \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ,
* it must be called later with the *same* arguments,
* until it returns a value greater that or equal to 0. When
* the function returns MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE there may be
* the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE there may be
* some partial data in the output buffer, however this is not
* yet sent.
*

View file

@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief Context for the default cookie functions.
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx
{
mbedtls_md_context_t hmac_ctx; /*!< context for the HMAC portion */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)

View file

@ -93,6 +93,14 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE
#endif
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */
@ -155,6 +163,9 @@
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN ( MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
( MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN ) )
/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4
/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for
RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes
(the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.)
@ -284,7 +295,18 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
int ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */
enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */
ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */
ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */
ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */
ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */
ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */
} ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */
size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */
unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */
@ -294,18 +316,45 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
unsigned char verify_cookie_len; /*!< Cli: cookie length
Srv: flag for sending a cookie */
unsigned char *hs_msg; /*!< Reassembled handshake message */
uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */
unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */
unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */
unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the
flight being received */
mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for
resending messages */
unsigned char alt_out_ctr[8]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter
for resending messages */
struct
{
size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated
* buffers used for message buffering. */
uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has
* been seen in the current flight. */
struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer
{
unsigned is_valid : 1;
unsigned is_fragmented : 1;
unsigned is_complete : 1;
unsigned char *data;
size_t data_len;
} hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS];
struct
{
unsigned char *data;
size_t len;
unsigned epoch;
} future_record;
} buffering;
uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/*
@ -364,6 +413,8 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
};
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer;
/*
* This structure contains a full set of runtime transform parameters
* either in negotiation or active.
@ -478,7 +529,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
@ -490,7 +540,10 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
* of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation
* of the secure transport.
*
* \param ssl SSL context to use
* \param ssl The SSL context to use.
* \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest
* should be automatically updated in case
* a handshake message is found.
*
* \return 0 or non-zero error code.
*
@ -556,10 +609,12 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
* following the above definition.
*
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_read_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned update_hs_digest );
int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want );
int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_write_record( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint8_t force_flush );
int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
@ -668,6 +723,7 @@ static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_resend( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl );
#endif
/* Visible for testing purposes only */

View file

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief Information for session ticket protection
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key
{
unsigned char name[4]; /*!< random key identifier */
uint32_t generation_time; /*!< key generation timestamp (seconds) */
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key;
/**
* \brief Context for session ticket handling functions
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context
{
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key keys[2]; /*!< ticket protection keys */
unsigned char active; /*!< index of the currently active key */

View file

@ -36,13 +36,16 @@
extern "C" {
#endif
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE is deprecated and should not be
* used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x001A /**< The selected feature is not available. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x001C /**< Bad input parameters to function. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR -0x001E /**< Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD)
#include <pthread.h>
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_threading_mutex_t
{
pthread_mutex_t mutex;
char is_valid;
@ -99,6 +102,17 @@ extern int (*mbedtls_mutex_unlock)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT)
/* This mutex may or may not be used in the default definition of
* mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(), but in order to determine that,
* we need to check POSIX features, hence modify _POSIX_C_SOURCE.
* With the current approach, this declaration is orphaned, lacking
* an accompanying definition, in case mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r()
* doesn't need it, but that's not a problem. */
extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
#ifdef __cplusplus

View file

@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time
/**
* \brief Context for mbedtls_timing_set/get_delay()
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_timing_delay_context
{
struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time timer;
uint32_t int_ms;

View file

@ -39,17 +39,17 @@
* Major, Minor, Patchlevel
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 2
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 12
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 0
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 14
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 1
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x020C0000
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.12.0"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.12.0"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x020E0100
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "2.14.1"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "mbed TLS 2.14.1"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)

View file

@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ mbedtls_x509_crt;
*
* All lists are bitfields, built by ORing flags from MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG().
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt_profile
{
uint32_t allowed_mds; /**< MDs for signatures */
uint32_t allowed_pks; /**< PK algs for signatures */
@ -143,6 +143,63 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_cert
}
mbedtls_x509write_cert;
/**
* Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it
*/
typedef struct {
mbedtls_x509_crt *crt;
uint32_t flags;
} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item;
/**
* Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root
*/
#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE ( MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2 )
/**
* Verification chain as built by \c mbedtls_crt_verify_chain()
*/
typedef struct
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item items[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE];
unsigned len;
} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
* \brief Context for resuming X.509 verify operations
*/
typedef struct
{
/* for check_signature() */
mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx pk;
/* for find_parent_in() */
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; /* non-null iff parent_in in progress */
mbedtls_x509_crt *fallback_parent;
int fallback_signature_is_good;
/* for find_parent() */
int parent_is_trusted; /* -1 if find_parent is not in progress */
/* for verify_chain() */
enum {
x509_crt_rs_none,
x509_crt_rs_find_parent,
} in_progress; /* none if no operation is in progress */
int self_cnt;
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain;
} mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx;
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */
typedef void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/**
* Default security profile. Should provide a good balance between security
@ -353,6 +410,37 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy );
/**
* \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile()
*
* \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile()
* but can return early and restart according to the limit
* set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
*
* \param crt a certificate (chain) to be verified
* \param trust_ca the list of trusted CAs
* \param ca_crl the list of CRLs for trusted CAs
* \param profile security profile for verification
* \param cn expected Common Name (can be set to
* NULL if the CN must not be verified)
* \param flags result of the verification
* \param f_vrfy verification function
* \param p_vrfy verification parameter
* \param rs_ctx restart context (NULL to disable restart)
*
* \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile(), or
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
* operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)
/**
* \brief Check usage of certificate against keyUsage extension.
@ -424,6 +512,18 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_init( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt );
* \param crt Certificate chain to free
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/**
* \brief Initialize a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx );
/**
* \brief Free the components of a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
/* \} name */

View file

@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
#define MBEDTLS_XTEA_DECRYPT 0
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0028 /**< The data input has an invalid length. */
/* MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED is deprecated and should not be used. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_XTEA_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0029 /**< XTEA hardware accelerator failed. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -50,7 +52,7 @@ extern "C" {
/**
* \brief XTEA context structure
*/
typedef struct
typedef struct mbedtls_xtea_context
{
uint32_t k[4]; /*!< key */
}

View file

@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C)
#include "mbedtls/padlock.h"
@ -1142,11 +1143,11 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
unsigned char prev_tweak[16];
unsigned char tmp[16];
/* Sectors must be at least 16 bytes. */
/* Data units must be at least 16 bytes long. */
if( length < 16 )
return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
/* NIST SP 80-38E disallows data units larger than 2**20 blocks. */
/* NIST SP 800-38E disallows data units larger than 2**20 blocks. */
if( length > ( 1 << 20 ) * 16 )
return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
@ -1757,7 +1758,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose )
* there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
*/
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && keybits == 192 )
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" );
continue;
@ -1821,7 +1822,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose )
* there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
*/
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && keybits == 192 )
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" );
continue;
@ -1886,7 +1887,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose )
* there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
*/
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && keybits == 192 )
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" );
continue;
@ -1949,7 +1950,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose )
* there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
*/
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && keybits == 192 )
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" );
continue;

View file

@ -875,11 +875,11 @@ static const uint8_t aria_test2_ctr_ct[3][48] = // CTR ciphertext
#define ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL \
{ \
if( verbose ) \
printf( "failed\n" ); \
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); \
return( 1 ); \
} else { \
if( verbose ) \
printf( "passed\n" ); \
mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); \
}
/*
@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
{
/* test ECB encryption */
if( verbose )
printf( " ARIA-ECB-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-ECB-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test1_ecb_key, 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( &ctx, aria_test1_ecb_pt, blk );
if( memcmp( blk, aria_test1_ecb_ct[i], MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) != 0 )
@ -916,14 +916,14 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
/* test ECB decryption */
if( verbose )
printf( " ARIA-ECB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-ECB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( &ctx, aria_test1_ecb_key, 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb( &ctx, aria_test1_ecb_ct[i], blk );
if( memcmp( blk, aria_test1_ecb_pt, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ) != 0 )
ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL;
}
if( verbose )
printf( "\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
/*
* Test set 2
@ -933,7 +933,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
{
/* Test CBC encryption */
if( verbose )
printf( " ARIA-CBC-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CBC-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i );
memcpy( iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE );
memset( buf, 0x55, sizeof( buf ) );
@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
/* Test CBC decryption */
if( verbose )
printf( " ARIA-CBC-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CBC-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i );
memcpy( iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE );
memset( buf, 0xAA, sizeof( buf ) );
@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL;
}
if( verbose )
printf( "\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
@ -963,7 +963,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
{
/* Test CFB encryption */
if( verbose )
printf( " ARIA-CFB-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CFB-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i );
memcpy( iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE );
memset( buf, 0x55, sizeof( buf ) );
@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
/* Test CFB decryption */
if( verbose )
printf( " ARIA-CFB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CFB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i );
memcpy( iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE );
memset( buf, 0xAA, sizeof( buf ) );
@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL;
}
if( verbose )
printf( "\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
{
/* Test CTR encryption */
if( verbose )
printf( " ARIA-CTR-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CTR-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i );
memset( iv, 0, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); // IV = 0
memset( buf, 0x55, sizeof( buf ) );
@ -1006,7 +1006,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
/* Test CTR decryption */
if( verbose )
printf( " ARIA-CTR-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_printf( " ARIA-CTR-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i );
mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc( &ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i );
memset( iv, 0, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE ); // IV = 0
memset( buf, 0xAA, sizeof( buf ) );
@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_self_test( int verbose )
ARIA_SELF_TEST_IF_FAIL;
}
if( verbose )
printf( "\n" );
mbedtls_printf( "\n" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
return( 0 );

View file

@ -257,34 +257,37 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val )
return( (int) len );
}
int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *text, size_t text_len )
int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int tag,
const char *text, size_t text_len )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start,
(const unsigned char *) text, text_len ) );
(const unsigned char *) text, text_len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, tag ) );
return( (int) len );
}
int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *text, size_t text_len )
{
return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING, text, text_len) );
}
int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *text, size_t text_len )
{
return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING, text, text_len) );
}
int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *text, size_t text_len )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start,
(const unsigned char *) text, text_len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING ) );
return( (int) len );
return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING, text, text_len) );
}
int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,

View file

@ -321,6 +321,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos )
return( ( X->p[pos / biL] >> ( pos % biL ) ) & 0x01 );
}
/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */
#define GET_BYTE( X, i ) \
( ( ( X )->p[( i ) / ciL] >> ( ( ( i ) % ciL ) * 8 ) ) & 0xff )
/*
* Set a bit to a specific value of 0 or 1
*/
@ -704,19 +708,40 @@ cleanup:
/*
* Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen )
{
size_t i, j, n;
size_t stored_bytes = X->n * ciL;
size_t bytes_to_copy;
unsigned char *p;
size_t i;
n = mbedtls_mpi_size( X );
if( stored_bytes < buflen )
{
/* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial
* null bytes and record the position at which to start
* writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution
* trace of this function does not depend on the value of the
* number. */
bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes;
p = buf + buflen - stored_bytes;
memset( buf, 0, buflen - stored_bytes );
}
else
{
/* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X.
* However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */
bytes_to_copy = buflen;
p = buf;
for( i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++ )
{
if( GET_BYTE( X, i ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
}
if( buflen < n )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
memset( buf, 0, buflen );
for( i = buflen - 1, j = 0; n > 0; i--, j++, n-- )
buf[i] = (unsigned char)( X->p[j / ciL] >> ((j % ciL) << 3) );
for( i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++ )
p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE( X, i );
return( 0 );
}
@ -2056,12 +2081,12 @@ cleanup:
/*
* Miller-Rabin pseudo-primality test (HAC 4.24)
*/
static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
int ret, count;
size_t i, j, k, n, s;
size_t i, j, k, s;
mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A );
@ -2077,27 +2102,12 @@ static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &R, s ) );
i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X );
/*
* HAC, table 4.4
*/
n = ( ( i >= 1300 ) ? 2 : ( i >= 850 ) ? 3 :
( i >= 650 ) ? 4 : ( i >= 350 ) ? 8 :
( i >= 250 ) ? 12 : ( i >= 150 ) ? 18 : 27 );
for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
for( i = 0; i < rounds; i++ )
{
/*
* pick a random A, 1 < A < |X| - 1
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &A, X->n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) );
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) >= 0 )
{
j = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &A ) - mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &W );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &A, j + 1 ) );
}
A.p[0] |= 3;
count = 0;
do {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &A, X->n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) );
@ -2105,7 +2115,7 @@ static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
j = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &A );
k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &W );
if (j > k) {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &A, j - k ) );
A.p[A.n - 1] &= ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << ( k - ( A.n - 1 ) * biL - 1 ) ) - 1;
}
if (count++ > 30) {
@ -2160,9 +2170,9 @@ cleanup:
/*
* Pseudo-primality test: small factors, then Miller-Rabin
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi XX;
@ -2186,17 +2196,34 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
return( ret );
}
return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, f_rng, p_rng ) );
return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/*
* Pseudo-primality test, error probability 2^-80
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
/*
* In the past our key generation aimed for an error rate of at most
* 2^-80. Since this function is deprecated, aim for the same certainty
* here as well.
*/
return mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, 40, f_rng, p_rng );
}
#endif
/*
* Prime number generation
*
* If dh_flag is 0 and nbits is at least 1024, then the procedure
* follows the RSA probably-prime generation method of FIPS 186-4.
* NB. FIPS 186-4 only allows the specific bit lengths of 1024 and 1536.
* To generate an RSA key in a way recommended by FIPS 186-4, both primes must
* be either 1024 bits or 1536 bits long, and flags must contain
* MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR.
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag,
int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
@ -2209,6 +2236,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag,
#endif
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
size_t k, n;
int rounds;
mbedtls_mpi_uint r;
mbedtls_mpi Y;
@ -2219,6 +2247,27 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag,
n = BITS_TO_LIMBS( nbits );
if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR ) == 0 )
{
/*
* 2^-80 error probability, number of rounds chosen per HAC, table 4.4
*/
rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1300 ) ? 2 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 3 :
( nbits >= 650 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 350 ) ? 8 :
( nbits >= 250 ) ? 12 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 18 : 27 );
}
else
{
/*
* 2^-100 error probability, number of rounds computed based on HAC,
* fact 4.48
*/
rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1450 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 1150 ) ? 5 :
( nbits >= 1000 ) ? 6 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 7 :
( nbits >= 750 ) ? 8 : ( nbits >= 500 ) ? 13 :
( nbits >= 250 ) ? 28 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 40 : 51 );
}
while( 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( X, n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) );
@ -2229,9 +2278,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag,
if( k > nbits ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, k - nbits ) );
X->p[0] |= 1;
if( dh_flag == 0 )
if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH ) == 0 )
{
ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( X, f_rng, p_rng );
ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE )
goto cleanup;
@ -2264,8 +2313,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag,
*/
if( ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( X ) ) == 0 &&
( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( &Y ) ) == 0 &&
( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( X, f_rng, p_rng ) ) == 0 &&
( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( &Y, f_rng, p_rng ) ) == 0 )
( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) )
== 0 &&
( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( &Y, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) )
== 0 )
goto cleanup;
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE )

View file

@ -381,7 +381,8 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
*/
#define NB_TESTS 3
#define CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN 24
#define CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN 32
/*
* The data is the same for all tests, only the used length changes
*/
@ -401,7 +402,7 @@ static const unsigned char ad[] = {
0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13
};
static const unsigned char msg[] = {
static const unsigned char msg[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN] = {
0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27,
0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f,
0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37,
@ -412,7 +413,7 @@ static const size_t add_len[NB_TESTS] = { 8, 16, 20 };
static const size_t msg_len[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 16, 24 };
static const size_t tag_len[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 6, 8 };
static const unsigned char res[NB_TESTS][32] = {
static const unsigned char res[NB_TESTS][CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN] = {
{ 0x71, 0x62, 0x01, 0x5b, 0x4d, 0xac, 0x25, 0x5d },
{ 0xd2, 0xa1, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0x51, 0xea, 0x5f, 0x62,
0x08, 0x1a, 0x77, 0x92, 0x07, 0x3d, 0x59, 0x3d,
@ -426,7 +427,13 @@ static const unsigned char res[NB_TESTS][32] = {
int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose )
{
mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
unsigned char out[32];
/*
* Some hardware accelerators require the input and output buffers
* would be in RAM, because the flash is not accessible.
* Use buffers on the stack to hold the test vectors data.
*/
unsigned char plaintext[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN];
unsigned char ciphertext[CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN];
size_t i;
int ret;
@ -445,27 +452,32 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_self_test( int verbose )
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( " CCM-AES #%u: ", (unsigned int) i + 1 );
memset( plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN );
memset( ciphertext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN );
memcpy( plaintext, msg, msg_len[i] );
ret = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag( &ctx, msg_len[i],
iv, iv_len[i], ad, add_len[i],
msg, out,
out + msg_len[i], tag_len[i] );
iv, iv_len[i], ad, add_len[i],
plaintext, ciphertext,
ciphertext + msg_len[i], tag_len[i] );
if( ret != 0 ||
memcmp( out, res[i], msg_len[i] + tag_len[i] ) != 0 )
memcmp( ciphertext, res[i], msg_len[i] + tag_len[i] ) != 0 )
{
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );
return( 1 );
}
memset( plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN );
ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt( &ctx, msg_len[i],
iv, iv_len[i], ad, add_len[i],
res[i], out,
res[i] + msg_len[i], tag_len[i] );
iv, iv_len[i], ad, add_len[i],
ciphertext, plaintext,
ciphertext + msg_len[i], tag_len[i] );
if( ret != 0 ||
memcmp( out, msg, msg_len[i] ) != 0 )
memcmp( plaintext, msg, msg_len[i] ) != 0 )
{
if( verbose != 0 )
mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" );

View file

@ -218,12 +218,13 @@ const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa );
const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[] = "PolarSSLTest";
const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa ) - 1;
/* tests/data_files/server2.crt */
const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"
"MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n"
"MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n"
"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n"
"MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n"
"A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMTCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n"
"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n"
"AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n"
"owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n"
"NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n"
@ -231,16 +232,17 @@ const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] =
"hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n"
"HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n"
"VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n"
"FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAJxnXClY\r\n"
"oHkbp70cqBrsGXLybA74czbO5RdLEgFs7rHVS9r+c293luS/KdliLScZqAzYVylw\r\n"
"UfRWvKMoWhHYKp3dEIS4xTXk6/5zXxhv9Rw8SGc8qn6vITHk1S1mPevtekgasY5Y\r\n"
"iWQuM3h4YVlRH3HHEMAD1TnAexfXHHDFQGe+Bd1iAbz1/sH9H8l4StwX6egvTK3M\r\n"
"wXRwkKkvjKaEDA9ATbZx0mI8LGsxSuCqe9r9dyjmttd47J1p1Rulz3CLzaRcVIuS\r\n"
"RRQfaD8neM9c1S/iJ/amTVqJxA1KOdOS5780WhPfSArA+g4qAmSjelc3p4wWpha8\r\n"
"zhuYwjVuX6JHG0c=\r\n"
"FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAAFzC0rF\r\n"
"y6De8WMcdgQrEw3AhBHFjzqnxZw1ene4IBSC7lTw8rBSy3jOWQdPUWn+0y/pCeeF\r\n"
"kti6sevFdl1hLemGtd4q+T9TKEKGg3ND4ARfB5AUZZ9uEHq8WBkiwus5clGS17Qd\r\n"
"dS/TOisB59tQruLx1E1bPLtBKyqk4koC5WAULJwfpswGSyWJTpYwIpxcWE3D2tBu\r\n"
"UB6MZfXZFzWmWEOyKbeoXjXe8GBCGgHLywvYDsGQ36HSGtEsAvR2QaTLSxWYcfk1\r\n"
"fbDn4jSWkb4yZy1r01UEigFQtONieGwRFaUqEcFJHJvEEGVgh9keaVlOj2vrwf5r\r\n"
"4mN4lW7gLdenN6g=\r\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n";
const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa );
/* tests/data_files/server2.key */
const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] =
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"
"MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwU2j3efNHdEE10lyuJmsDnjkOjxKzzoTFtBa5M2jAIin7h5r\r\n"
@ -271,11 +273,12 @@ const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] =
"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n";
const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa );
/* tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt */
const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"
"MIIDhTCCAm2gAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n"
"MIIDPzCCAiegAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n"
"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n"
"MTcwNTA1MTMwNzU5WhcNMjcwNTA2MTMwNzU5WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n"
"MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n"
"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMMEVBvbGFyU1NMIENsaWVudCAyMIIBIjAN\r\n"
"BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6f\r\n"
"M60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaFB9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu\r\n"
@ -283,18 +286,18 @@ const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[] =
"MjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v\r\n"
"4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx/\r\n"
"/DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+vdqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQAB\r\n"
"o4GSMIGPMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITBjBgNVHSMEXDBa\r\n"
"gBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/6E/pD0wOzELMAkGA1UEBhMCTkwxETAPBgNV\r\n"
"BAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRkwFwYDVQQDDBBQb2xhclNTTCBUZXN0IENBggEAMAkGA1Ud\r\n"
"EwQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC7yO786NvcHpK8UovKIG9cB32oSQQom\r\n"
"LoR0eHDRzdqEkoq7yGZufHFiRAAzbMqJfogRtxlrWAeB4y/jGaMBV25IbFOIcH2W\r\n"
"iCEaMMbG+VQLKNvuC63kmw/Zewc9ThM6Pa1Hcy0axT0faf1B/U01j0FIcw/6mTfK\r\n"
"D8w48OIwc1yr0JtutCVjig5DC0yznGMt32RyseOLcUe+lfq005v2PAiCozr5X8rE\r\n"
"ofGZpiM2NqRPePgYy+Vc75Zk28xkRQq1ncprgQb3S4vTsZdScpM9hLf+eMlrgqlj\r\n"
"c5PLSkXBeLE5+fedkyfTaLxxQlgCpuoOhKBm04/R1pWNzUHyqagjO9Q=\r\n"
"o00wSzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITAf\r\n"
"BgNVHSMEGDAWgBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\r\n"
"AQEAlHabem2Tu69VUN7EipwnQn1dIHdgvT5i+iQHpSxY1crPnBbAeSdAXwsVEqLQ\r\n"
"gOOIAQD5VIITNuoGgo4i+4OpNh9u7ZkpRHla+/swsfrFWRRbBNP5Bcu74AGLstwU\r\n"
"zM8gIkBiyfM1Q1qDQISV9trlCG6O8vh8dp/rbI3rfzo99BOHXgFCrzXjCuW4vDsF\r\n"
"r+Dao26bX3sJ6UnEWg1H3o2x6PpUcvQ36h71/bz4TEbbUUEpe02V4QWuL+wrhHJL\r\n"
"U7o3SVE3Og7jPF8sat0a50YUWhwEFI256m02KAXLg89ueUyYKEr6rNwhcvXJpvU9\r\n"
"giIVvd0Sbjjnn7NC4VDbcXV8vw==\r\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n";
const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa );
/* tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key */
const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[] =
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"
"MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6fM60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaF\r\n"

View file

@ -237,9 +237,13 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len )
{
size_t actual_iv_size;
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info || NULL == iv )
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
else if( NULL == iv && iv_len != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( NULL == iv && iv_len == 0 )
ctx->iv_size = 0;
/* avoid buffer overflow in ctx->iv */
if( iv_len > MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH )
@ -268,8 +272,11 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
}
#endif
memcpy( ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size );
ctx->iv_size = actual_iv_size;
if ( actual_iv_size != 0 )
{
memcpy( ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size );
ctx->iv_size = actual_iv_size;
}
return( 0 );
}

View file

@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ecb_info = {
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
128,
"AES-128-ECB",
16,
0,
0,
16,
&aes_info
@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ecb_info = {
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
192,
"AES-192-ECB",
16,
0,
0,
16,
&aes_info
@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ecb_info = {
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
256,
"AES-256-ECB",
16,
0,
0,
16,
&aes_info

View file

@ -66,6 +66,18 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx )
* Non-public function wrapped by mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(). Necessary to allow
* NIST tests to succeed (which require known length fixed entropy)
*/
/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.3.2)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len(ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy,
* custom, len, entropy_len)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string,
* security_strength) -> initial_working_state
* with inputs
* custom[:len] = nonce || personalization_string
* where entropy_input comes from f_entropy for entropy_len bytes
* and with outputs
* ctx = initial_working_state
*/
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len(
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
@ -256,6 +268,14 @@ exit:
return( ret );
}
/* CTR_DRBG_Update (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.2)
* ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, provided_data)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Update(provided_data, Key, V)
* with inputs and outputs
* ctx->aes_ctx = Key
* ctx->counter = V
*/
static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN] )
{
@ -279,9 +299,7 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
* Crypt counter block
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, ctx->counter, p ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
goto exit;
p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
}
@ -293,31 +311,70 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
* Update key and counter
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc( &ctx->aes_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
goto exit;
memcpy( ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE );
return( 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
return( ret );
}
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len )
/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.3.2)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, additional, add_len)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string,
* security_strength) -> initial_working_state
* with inputs
* ctx->counter = all-bits-0
* ctx->aes_ctx = context from all-bits-0 key
* additional[:add_len] = entropy_input || nonce || personalization_string
* and with outputs
* ctx = initial_working_state
*/
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional,
size_t add_len )
{
unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
int ret;
if( add_len > 0 )
{
/* MAX_INPUT would be more logical here, but we have to match
* block_cipher_df()'s limits since we can't propagate errors */
if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
add_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT;
if( add_len == 0 )
return( 0 );
block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len );
ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input );
}
if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( add_input, sizeof( add_input ) );
return( ret );
}
/* Deprecated function, kept for backward compatibility. */
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional,
size_t add_len )
{
/* MAX_INPUT would be more logical here, but we have to match
* block_cipher_df()'s limits since we can't propagate errors */
if( add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT )
add_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT;
(void) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len );
}
/* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.4.2)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional_input)
* -> new_working_state
* with inputs
* ctx contains working_state
* additional[:len] = additional_input
* and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy
* and with output
* ctx contains new_working_state
*/
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t len )
{
@ -355,22 +412,39 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
* Reduce to 384 bits
*/
if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( seed, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
goto exit;
/*
* Update state
*/
if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, seed ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
goto exit;
ctx->reseed_counter = 1;
return( 0 );
exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, sizeof( seed ) );
return( ret );
}
/* CTR_DRBG_Generate with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.5.2)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, output_len, additional, add_len)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional[:add_len])
* -> working_state_after_reseed
* if required, then
* CTR_DRBG_Generate(working_state_after_reseed,
* requested_number_of_bits, additional_input)
* -> status, returned_bits, new_working_state
* with inputs
* ctx contains working_state
* requested_number_of_bits = 8 * output_len
* additional[:add_len] = additional_input
* and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy
* and with outputs
* status = SUCCESS (this function does the reseed internally)
* returned_bits = output[:output_len]
* ctx contains new_working_state
*/
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_len,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len )
@ -404,13 +478,9 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng,
if( add_len > 0 )
{
if( ( ret = block_cipher_df( add_input, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
goto exit;
if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
goto exit;
}
while( output_len > 0 )
@ -426,9 +496,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng,
* Crypt counter block
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb( &ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, ctx->counter, tmp ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
goto exit;
use_len = ( output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE ) ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE :
output_len;
@ -441,12 +509,13 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng,
}
if( ( ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal( ctx, add_input ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
goto exit;
ctx->reseed_counter++;
exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( add_input, sizeof( add_input ) );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( tmp, sizeof( tmp ) );
return( 0 );
}
@ -518,7 +587,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char
if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
else
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n );
ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret( ctx, buf, n );
fclose( f );

View file

@ -40,36 +40,62 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT)
/*
* Generate public key: simple wrapper around mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair
* Generate public key (restartable version)
*
* Note: this internal function relies on its caller preserving the value of
* the output parameter 'd' across continuation calls. This would not be
* acceptable for a public function but is OK here as we control call sites.
*/
static int ecdh_gen_public_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
/* If multiplication is in progress, we already generated a privkey */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx == NULL || rs_ctx->rsm == NULL )
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, d, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, Q, d, &grp->G,
f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
cleanup:
return( ret );
}
/*
* Generate public key
*/
int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( grp, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng );
return( ecdh_gen_public_restartable( grp, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT)
/*
* Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1)
*/
int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z,
static int ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *z,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_ecp_point P;
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P );
/*
* Make sure Q is a valid pubkey before using it
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, Q ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, &P, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &P, d, Q,
f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &P ) )
{
@ -84,14 +110,39 @@ cleanup:
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */
/*
* Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1)
*/
int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
return( ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( grp, z, Q, d,
f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */
/*
* Initialize context
*/
void mbedtls_ecdh_init( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdh_context ) );
mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &ctx->grp );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->d );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Q );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Qp );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->z );
ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Vi );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Vf );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->_d );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
ctx->restart_enabled = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx->rs );
#endif
}
/*
@ -103,15 +154,29 @@ void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx )
return;
mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ctx->grp );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->d );
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Q );
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Qp );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->z );
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Vi );
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Vf );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->d );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->z );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->_d );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->rs );
#endif
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Enable restartable operations for context
*/
void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx )
{
ctx->restart_enabled = 1;
}
#endif
/*
* Setup and write the ServerKeyExhange parameters (RFC 4492)
* struct {
@ -126,13 +191,28 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
{
int ret;
size_t grp_len, pt_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL;
#endif
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) )
!= 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ctx->restart_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ctx->rs;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ( ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#else
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( &ctx->grp, &grp_len, buf, blen ) )
!= 0 )
@ -142,7 +222,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
blen -= grp_len;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, ctx->point_format,
&pt_len, buf, blen ) ) != 0 )
&pt_len, buf, blen ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
*olen = grp_len + pt_len;
@ -206,13 +286,27 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL;
#endif
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) )
!= 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ctx->restart_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ctx->rs;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ( ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#else
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
return mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, ctx->point_format,
olen, buf, blen );
@ -248,15 +342,31 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL;
#endif
if( ctx == NULL )
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, &ctx->d,
f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ctx->restart_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ctx->rs;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ( ret = ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( &ctx->grp,
&ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, &ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
#else
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp,
&ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
if( mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->z ) > blen )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );

View file

@ -42,6 +42,178 @@
#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdlib.h>
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Sub-context for ecdsa_verify()
*/
struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver
{
mbedtls_mpi u1, u2; /* intermediate values */
enum { /* what to do next? */
ecdsa_ver_init = 0, /* getting started */
ecdsa_ver_muladd, /* muladd step */
} state;
};
/*
* Init verify restart sub-context
*/
static void ecdsa_restart_ver_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx )
{
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->u1 );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->u2 );
ctx->state = ecdsa_ver_init;
}
/*
* Free the components of a verify restart sub-context
*/
static void ecdsa_restart_ver_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->u1 );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->u2 );
ecdsa_restart_ver_init( ctx );
}
/*
* Sub-context for ecdsa_sign()
*/
struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig
{
int sign_tries;
int key_tries;
mbedtls_mpi k; /* per-signature random */
mbedtls_mpi r; /* r value */
enum { /* what to do next? */
ecdsa_sig_init = 0, /* getting started */
ecdsa_sig_mul, /* doing ecp_mul() */
ecdsa_sig_modn, /* mod N computations */
} state;
};
/*
* Init verify sign sub-context
*/
static void ecdsa_restart_sig_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx )
{
ctx->sign_tries = 0;
ctx->key_tries = 0;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->k );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->r );
ctx->state = ecdsa_sig_init;
}
/*
* Free the components of a sign restart sub-context
*/
static void ecdsa_restart_sig_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->k );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->r );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
/*
* Sub-context for ecdsa_sign_det()
*/
struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; /* DRBG state */
enum { /* what to do next? */
ecdsa_det_init = 0, /* getting started */
ecdsa_det_sign, /* make signature */
} state;
};
/*
* Init verify sign_det sub-context
*/
static void ecdsa_restart_det_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx )
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx->rng_ctx );
ctx->state = ecdsa_det_init;
}
/*
* Free the components of a sign_det restart sub-context
*/
static void ecdsa_restart_det_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx->rng_ctx );
ecdsa_restart_det_init( ctx );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
#define ECDSA_RS_ECP &rs_ctx->ecp
/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */
#define ECDSA_BUDGET( ops ) \
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( grp, &rs_ctx->ecp, ops ) );
/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */
#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER( SUB ) do { \
/* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ecp.depth++ == 0 ) \
rs_ctx->ecp.ops_done = 0; \
\
/* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \
if( mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \
rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \
{ \
rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *rs_ctx->SUB ) ); \
if( rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); \
\
ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_init( rs_ctx->SUB ); \
} \
} while( 0 )
/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */
#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) do { \
/* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) \
{ \
ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \
mbedtls_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \
rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \
} \
\
if( rs_ctx != NULL ) \
rs_ctx->ecp.depth--; \
} while( 0 )
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#define ECDSA_RS_ECP NULL
#define ECDSA_BUDGET( ops ) /* no-op; for compatibility */
#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER( SUB ) (void) rs_ctx
#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) (void) rs_ctx
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/*
* Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len
* SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3
@ -70,13 +242,17 @@ cleanup:
* Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3)
* Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message)
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries, blind_tries;
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries;
int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries;
mbedtls_ecp_point R;
mbedtls_mpi k, e, t;
mbedtls_mpi *pk = &k, *pr = r;
/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
if( grp->N.p == NULL )
@ -89,26 +265,72 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t );
sign_tries = 0;
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( sig );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
p_sign_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->sign_tries;
p_key_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->key_tries;
pk = &rs_ctx->sig->k;
pr = &rs_ctx->sig->r;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_mul )
goto mul;
if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_modn )
goto modn;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
*p_sign_tries = 0;
do
{
if( *p_sign_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair
* and set r = xR mod n
*/
key_tries = 0;
*p_key_tries = 0;
do
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( grp, &k, &R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( r, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
if( key_tries++ > 10 )
if( *p_key_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_mul;
mul:
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &R, pk, &grp->G,
f_rng, p_rng, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pr, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 0 ) == 0 );
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( pr, 0 ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_modn;
modn:
#endif
/*
* Accounting for everything up to the end of the loop
* (step 6, but checking now avoids saving e and t)
*/
ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 4 );
/*
* Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message
@ -119,57 +341,60 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
* Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
* avoiding a potential timing leak.
*/
blind_tries = 0;
do
{
size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
/* See mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair() */
if( ++blind_tries > 30 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &t, 1 ) < 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &t, &grp->N ) >= 0 );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &t, f_rng, p_rng ) );
/*
* Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, r, d ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, pr, d ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &k, &k, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, &k, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pk, pk, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, pk, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );
if( sign_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
mbedtls_mpi_copy( r, pr );
#endif
cleanup:
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( sig );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
/*
* Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
return( ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
/*
* Deterministic signature wrapper
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx;
unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
@ -181,21 +406,58 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi
mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( det );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign )
goto sign;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign;
sign:
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
#else
ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, rs_ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( det );
return( ret );
}
/*
* Deterministic signature wrapper
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
@ -203,21 +465,40 @@ cleanup:
* Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4)
* Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message)
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s)
static int ecdsa_verify_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2;
mbedtls_ecp_point R;
mbedtls_mpi *pu1 = &u1, *pu2 = &u2;
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 );
/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
if( grp->N.p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( ver );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
pu1 = &rs_ctx->ver->u1;
pu2 = &rs_ctx->ver->u2;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->ver->state == ecdsa_ver_muladd )
goto muladd;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/*
* Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1
*/
@ -228,11 +509,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Additional precaution: make sure Q is valid
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, Q ) );
/*
* Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message
*/
@ -241,21 +517,27 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
/*
* Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n
*/
ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 2 );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &s_inv, s, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u1, &e, &s_inv ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u1, &u1, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pu1, &e, &s_inv ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pu1, pu1, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u2, r, &s_inv ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u2, &u2, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pu2, r, &s_inv ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pu2, pu2, &grp->N ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL )
rs_ctx->ver->state = ecdsa_ver_muladd;
muladd:
#endif
/*
* Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q
*
* Since we're not using any secret data, no need to pass a RNG to
* mbedtls_ecp_mul() for countermesures.
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( grp, &R, &u1, &grp->G, &u2, Q ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( grp,
&R, pu1, &grp->G, pu2, Q, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &R ) )
{
@ -280,11 +562,24 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
cleanup:
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( ver );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
/*
* Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s)
{
return( ecdsa_verify_restartable( grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
/*
* Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1
@ -313,11 +608,13 @@ static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
/*
* Compute and write signature
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
@ -329,14 +626,19 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t
(void) f_rng;
(void) p_rng;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, md_alg ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, md_alg, rs_ctx ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#endif
#else
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
@ -347,7 +649,20 @@ cleanup:
return( ret );
}
#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \
/*
* Compute and write signature
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(
ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
@ -365,6 +680,18 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen )
{
return( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(
ctx, hash, hlen, sig, slen, NULL ) );
}
/*
* Restartable read and check signature
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig;
@ -395,10 +722,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
&ctx->Q, &r, &s ) ) != 0 )
&ctx->Q, &r, &s ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
#else
if( ( ret = ecdsa_verify_restartable( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
&ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
/* At this point we know that the buffer starts with a valid signature.
* Return 0 if the buffer just contains the signature, and a specific
@ -423,7 +755,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid,
return( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, gid ) ||
mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */
/*
* Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair
@ -458,4 +790,42 @@ void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx )
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ctx );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Initialize a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx->ecp );
ctx->ver = NULL;
ctx->sig = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
ctx->det = NULL;
#endif
}
/*
* Free the components of a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->ecp );
ecdsa_restart_ver_free( ctx->ver );
mbedtls_free( ctx->ver );
ctx->ver = NULL;
ecdsa_restart_sig_free( ctx->sig );
mbedtls_free( ctx->sig );
ctx->sig = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
ecdsa_restart_det_free( ctx->det );
mbedtls_free( ctx->det );
ctx->det = NULL;
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -165,6 +165,10 @@
#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C)
#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h"
#endif
@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The ECP hardware accelerator failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
@ -515,6 +521,10 @@ void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The asynchronous operation is not completed yet" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
@ -821,6 +831,13 @@ void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PADLOCK - Input data should be aligned" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "POLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)" );

View file

@ -48,9 +48,8 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include <stdio.h>
#define mbedtls_printf printf
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
@ -764,7 +763,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose )
* there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
*/
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && key_len == 192 )
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && key_len == 192 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" );
break;

View file

@ -66,29 +66,56 @@ void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx )
/*
* HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2)
*/
void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len )
int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional,
size_t add_len )
{
size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info );
unsigned char rounds = ( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) ? 2 : 1;
unsigned char sep[1];
unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
int ret;
for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ )
{
/* Step 1 or 4 */
mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, sep, 1 );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
sep, 1 ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( rounds == 2 )
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, additional, add_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, K );
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, K ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
/* Step 2 or 5 */
mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
}
exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( K, sizeof( K ) );
return( ret );
}
void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional,
size_t add_len )
{
(void) mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, additional, add_len );
}
/*
@ -108,10 +135,13 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
* Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the
* MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value.
*/
mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V,
mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
memset( ctx->V, 0x01, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, data, data_len );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, data, data_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
return( 0 );
}
@ -124,6 +154,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
{
unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT];
size_t seedlen;
int ret;
/* III. Check input length */
if( len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ||
@ -135,7 +166,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
memset( seed, 0, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT );
/* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */
if( ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy,
seed, ctx->entropy_len ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED );
seedlen = ctx->entropy_len;
@ -148,13 +180,16 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
}
/* 2. Update state */
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, seed, seedlen );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, seed, seedlen ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
/* 3. Reset reseed_counter */
ctx->reseed_counter = 1;
exit:
/* 4. Done */
return( 0 );
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( seed, seedlen );
return( ret );
}
/*
@ -180,7 +215,8 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
* Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the
* MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value.
*/
mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_size );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_size );
ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy;
@ -273,16 +309,24 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng,
/* 2. Use additional data if any */
if( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 )
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, additional, add_len );
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx,
additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
}
/* 3, 4, 5. Generate bytes */
while( left != 0 )
{
size_t use_len = left > md_len ? md_len : left;
mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx );
mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len );
mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx,
ctx->V, md_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
memcpy( out, ctx->V, use_len );
out += use_len;
@ -290,13 +334,16 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng,
}
/* 6. Update */
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, additional, add_len );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx,
additional, add_len ) ) != 0 )
goto exit;
/* 7. Update reseed counter */
ctx->reseed_counter++;
exit:
/* 8. Done */
return( 0 );
return( ret );
}
/*
@ -388,7 +435,7 @@ int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const ch
if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
else
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n );
ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( ctx, buf, n );
fclose( f );

View file

@ -69,6 +69,34 @@ void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_pk_context ) );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Initialize a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_pk_restart_init( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
ctx->pk_info = NULL;
ctx->rs_ctx = NULL;
}
/*
* Free the components of a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_pk_restart_free( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ||
ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func == NULL )
{
return;
}
ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func( ctx->rs_ctx );
ctx->pk_info = NULL;
ctx->rs_ctx = NULL;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/*
* Get pk_info structure from type
*/
@ -171,6 +199,73 @@ static inline int pk_hashlen_helper( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Helper to set up a restart context if needed
*/
static int pk_restart_setup( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx,
const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info )
{
/* Don't do anything if already set up or invalid */
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL )
return( 0 );
/* Should never happen when we're called */
if( info->rs_alloc_func == NULL || info->rs_free_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ( ctx->rs_ctx = info->rs_alloc_func() ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED );
ctx->pk_info = info;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/*
* Verify a signature (restartable)
*/
int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ||
pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */
if( rs_ctx != NULL &&
mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() &&
ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func != NULL )
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = pk_restart_setup( rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
ret = ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func( ctx->pk_ctx,
md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx->rs_ctx );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
mbedtls_pk_restart_free( rs_ctx );
return( ret );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
(void) rs_ctx;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
if( ctx->pk_info->verify_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
return( ctx->pk_info->verify_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len ) );
}
/*
* Verify a signature
*/
@ -178,15 +273,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ||
pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ctx->pk_info->verify_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
return( ctx->pk_info->verify_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len ) );
return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len, NULL ) );
}
/*
@ -247,6 +335,50 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options,
return( mbedtls_pk_verify( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) );
}
/*
* Make a signature (restartable)
*/
int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ||
pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */
if( rs_ctx != NULL &&
mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() &&
ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func != NULL )
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = pk_restart_setup( rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
ret = ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg,
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx->rs_ctx );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
mbedtls_pk_restart_free( rs_ctx );
return( ret );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
(void) rs_ctx;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
if( ctx->pk_info->sign_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
return( ctx->pk_info->sign_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
/*
* Make a signature
*/
@ -255,15 +387,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ||
pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ctx->pk_info->sign_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
return( ctx->pk_info->sign_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) );
return( mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
/*

View file

@ -190,11 +190,19 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info = {
rsa_can_do,
rsa_verify_wrap,
rsa_sign_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL,
NULL,
#endif
rsa_decrypt_wrap,
rsa_encrypt_wrap,
rsa_check_pair_wrap,
rsa_alloc_wrap,
rsa_free_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL,
NULL,
#endif
rsa_debug,
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
@ -262,6 +270,110 @@ static int eckey_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* Forward declarations */
static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
void *rs_ctx );
static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
void *rs_ctx );
/*
* Restart context for ECDSA operations with ECKEY context
*
* We need to store an actual ECDSA context, as we need to pass the same to
* the underlying ecdsa function, so we can't create it on the fly every time.
*/
typedef struct
{
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ecdsa_rs;
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_ctx;
} eckey_restart_ctx;
static void *eckey_rs_alloc( void )
{
eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx;
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( eckey_restart_ctx ) );
if( ctx != NULL )
{
rs_ctx = ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs );
mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx );
}
return( ctx );
}
static void eckey_rs_free( void *ctx )
{
eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx;
if( ctx == NULL)
return;
rs_ctx = ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs );
mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx );
mbedtls_free( ctx );
}
static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
void *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx;
/* Should never happen */
if( rs == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */
if( rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0 )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( &rs->ecdsa_ctx,
md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len, &rs->ecdsa_rs ) );
cleanup:
return( ret );
}
static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
void *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx;
/* Should never happen */
if( rs == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */
if( rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0 )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, md_alg,
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len,
f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs ) );
cleanup:
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
static int eckey_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv )
@ -301,15 +413,23 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
eckey_verify_wrap,
eckey_sign_wrap,
#else
NULL,
NULL,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
eckey_verify_rs_wrap,
eckey_sign_rs_wrap,
#endif
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
NULL,
NULL,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
NULL,
NULL,
eckey_check_pair,
eckey_alloc_wrap,
eckey_free_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
eckey_rs_alloc,
eckey_rs_free,
#endif
eckey_debug,
};
@ -329,11 +449,19 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info = {
eckeydh_can_do,
NULL,
NULL,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL,
NULL,
#endif
NULL,
NULL,
eckey_check_pair,
eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */
eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL,
NULL,
#endif
eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
@ -369,6 +497,40 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
void *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
((void) md_alg);
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(
(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len,
(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH );
return( ret );
}
static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
void *rs_ctx )
{
return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(
(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng,
(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap( void )
{
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_context ) );
@ -385,6 +547,24 @@ static void ecdsa_free_wrap( void *ctx )
mbedtls_free( ctx );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
static void *ecdsa_rs_alloc( void )
{
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ) );
if( ctx != NULL )
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( ctx );
return( ctx );
}
static void ecdsa_rs_free( void *ctx )
{
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( ctx );
mbedtls_free( ctx );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = {
MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
"ECDSA",
@ -392,11 +572,19 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = {
ecdsa_can_do,
ecdsa_verify_wrap,
ecdsa_sign_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap,
ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap,
#endif
NULL,
NULL,
eckey_check_pair, /* Compatible key structures */
ecdsa_alloc_wrap,
ecdsa_free_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
ecdsa_rs_alloc,
ecdsa_rs_free,
#endif
eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
@ -506,6 +694,10 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = {
rsa_alt_can_do,
NULL,
rsa_alt_sign_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL,
NULL,
#endif
rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap,
NULL,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
@ -515,6 +707,10 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = {
#endif
rsa_alt_alloc_wrap,
rsa_alt_free_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL,
NULL,
#endif
NULL,
};

View file

@ -1295,6 +1295,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
return( 0 );
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
mbedtls_pk_init( pk );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH )
{
@ -1306,39 +1307,42 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
return( 0 );
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
mbedtls_pk_init( pk );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ),
key, keylen ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
}
else
if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 &&
pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), key, keylen ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
mbedtls_pk_init( pk );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ),
key, keylen ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
}
else
if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 &&
pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ),
key, keylen ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
/* If MBEDTLS_RSA_C is defined but MBEDTLS_ECP_C isn't,
* it is ok to leave the PK context initialized but not
* freed: It is the caller's responsibility to call pk_init()
* before calling this function, and to call pk_free()
* when it fails. If MBEDTLS_ECP_C is defined but MBEDTLS_RSA_C
* isn't, this leads to mbedtls_pk_free() being called
* twice, once here and once by the caller, but this is
* also ok and in line with the mbedtls_pk_free() calls
* on failed PEM parsing attempts. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT );
}

View file

@ -30,7 +30,14 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY)
/* The compile time configuration of memory allocation via the macros
* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO takes precedence over the runtime
* configuration via mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(). So, omit everything
* related to the latter if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO are defined. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) && \
!( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) )
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC)
static void *platform_calloc_uninit( size_t n, size_t size )
{
@ -71,7 +78,9 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( void * (*calloc_func)( size_t, size_t ),
mbedtls_free_func = free_func;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY &&
!( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) &&
defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) ) */
#if defined(_WIN32)
#include <stdarg.h>

View file

@ -20,6 +20,14 @@
* This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
/*
* Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before
* config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms.
*/
#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE)
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
@ -27,6 +35,7 @@
#endif
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
#include <stddef.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -65,3 +74,62 @@ void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len )
memset_func( buf, 0, len );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT)
#include <time.h>
#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \
defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \
defined(__MACH__)))
#include <unistd.h>
#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ ||
* (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */
#if !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \
( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \
_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 20112L ) )
/*
* This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long
* preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in
* platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and
* threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so
* we keep it private by only defining it in this file
*/
#if ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) )
#define PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME
#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */
#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \
( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \
_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 20112L ) ) */
struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( const mbedtls_time_t *tt,
struct tm *tm_buf )
{
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
return( ( gmtime_s( tm_buf, tt ) == 0 ) ? tm_buf : NULL );
#elif !defined(PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME)
return( gmtime_r( tt, tm_buf ) );
#else
struct tm *lt;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ) != 0 )
return( NULL );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
lt = gmtime( tt );
if( lt != NULL )
{
memcpy( tm_buf, lt, sizeof( struct tm ) );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ) != 0 )
return( NULL );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
return( ( lt == NULL ) ? NULL : tm_buf );
#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */

View file

@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi H, G, L;
int prime_quality = 0;
if( f_rng == NULL || nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@ -509,6 +510,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
if( nbits % 2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/*
* If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of
* the RSA algorithm is less than or equal to 80 bits and therefore an error
* rate of 2^-80 is sufficient.
*/
if( nbits > 1024 )
prime_quality = MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &H );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &G );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &L );
@ -523,11 +532,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
do
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, nbits >> 1, 0,
f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, nbits >> 1,
prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, nbits >> 1, 0,
f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, nbits >> 1,
prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) );
/* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 step 5.4) */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
@ -1378,6 +1387,97 @@ cleanup:
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
/** Turn zero-or-nonzero into zero-or-all-bits-one, without branches.
*
* \param value The value to analyze.
* \return Zero if \p value is zero, otherwise all-bits-one.
*/
static unsigned all_or_nothing_int( unsigned value )
{
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
* well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
#endif
return( - ( ( value | - value ) >> ( sizeof( value ) * 8 - 1 ) ) );
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning( pop )
#endif
}
/** Check whether a size is out of bounds, without branches.
*
* This is equivalent to `size > max`, but is likely to be compiled to
* to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
*
* \param size Size to check.
* \param max Maximum desired value for \p size.
* \return \c 0 if `size <= max`.
* \return \c 1 if `size > max`.
*/
static unsigned size_greater_than( size_t size, size_t max )
{
/* Return the sign bit (1 for negative) of (max - size). */
return( ( max - size ) >> ( sizeof( size_t ) * 8 - 1 ) );
}
/** Choose between two integer values, without branches.
*
* This is equivalent to `cond ? if1 : if0`, but is likely to be compiled
* to code using bitwise operation rather than a branch.
*
* \param cond Condition to test.
* \param if1 Value to use if \p cond is nonzero.
* \param if0 Value to use if \p cond is zero.
* \return \c if1 if \p cond is nonzero, otherwise \c if0.
*/
static unsigned if_int( unsigned cond, unsigned if1, unsigned if0 )
{
unsigned mask = all_or_nothing_int( cond );
return( ( mask & if1 ) | (~mask & if0 ) );
}
/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer without leaking
* the length of the data through side channels.
*
* `mem_move_to_left(start, total, offset)` is functionally equivalent to
* ```
* memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset);
* memset(start + offset, 0, total - offset);
* ```
* but it strives to use a memory access pattern (and thus total timing)
* that does not depend on \p offset. This timing independence comes at
* the expense of performance.
*
* \param start Pointer to the start of the buffer.
* \param total Total size of the buffer.
* \param offset Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes.
*/
static void mem_move_to_left( void *start,
size_t total,
size_t offset )
{
volatile unsigned char *buf = start;
size_t i, n;
if( total == 0 )
return;
for( i = 0; i < total; i++ )
{
unsigned no_op = size_greater_than( total - offset, i );
/* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last
* `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and
* zero out the last byte. */
for( n = 0; n < total - 1; n++ )
{
unsigned char current = buf[n];
unsigned char next = buf[n+1];
buf[n] = if_int( no_op, current, next );
}
buf[total-1] = if_int( no_op, buf[total-1], 0 );
}
}
/*
* Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function
*/
@ -1387,18 +1487,34 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int mode, size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output,
size_t output_max_len)
size_t output_max_len )
{
int ret;
size_t ilen, pad_count = 0, i;
unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done = 0;
size_t ilen = ctx->len;
size_t i;
size_t plaintext_max_size = ( output_max_len > ilen - 11 ?
ilen - 11 :
output_max_len );
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
/* The following variables take sensitive values: their value must
* not leak into the observable behavior of the function other than
* the designated outputs (output, olen, return value). Otherwise
* this would open the execution of the function to
* side-channel-based variants of the Bleichenbacher padding oracle
* attack. Potential side channels include overall timing, memory
* access patterns (especially visible to an adversary who has access
* to a shared memory cache), and branches (especially visible to
* an adversary who has access to a shared code cache or to a shared
* branch predictor). */
size_t pad_count = 0;
unsigned bad = 0;
unsigned char pad_done = 0;
size_t plaintext_size = 0;
unsigned output_too_large;
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ilen = ctx->len;
if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@ -1409,63 +1525,109 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
if( ret != 0 )
goto cleanup;
p = buf;
bad = 0;
/* Check and get padding length in constant time and constant
* memory trace. The first byte must be 0. */
bad |= buf[0];
/*
* Check and get padding len in "constant-time"
*/
bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */
/* This test does not depend on secret data */
if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE )
{
bad |= *p++ ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
/* Decode EME-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00
* where PS must be at least 8 nonzero bytes. */
bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT;
/* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer
* (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ )
/* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
* the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count. */
for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
{
pad_done |= ((p[i] | (unsigned char)-p[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
pad_done |= ((buf[i] | (unsigned char)-buf[i]) >> 7) ^ 1;
pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1;
}
p += pad_count;
bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */
}
else
{
bad |= *p++ ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
/* Decode EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 padding: 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00
* where PS must be at least 8 bytes with the value 0xFF. */
bad |= buf[1] ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN;
/* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer
* (minus one, for the 00 byte) */
for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ )
/* Read the whole buffer. Set pad_done to nonzero if we find
* the 0x00 byte and remember the padding length in pad_count.
* If there's a non-0xff byte in the padding, the padding is bad. */
for( i = 2; i < ilen; i++ )
{
pad_done |= ( p[i] != 0xFF );
pad_count += ( pad_done == 0 );
pad_done |= if_int( buf[i], 0, 1 );
pad_count += if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, buf[i] ^ 0xFF );
}
p += pad_count;
bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */
}
bad |= ( pad_count < 8 );
/* If pad_done is still zero, there's no data, only unfinished padding. */
bad |= if_int( pad_done, 0, 1 );
if( bad )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
goto cleanup;
}
/* There must be at least 8 bytes of padding. */
bad |= size_greater_than( 8, pad_count );
if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
goto cleanup;
}
/* If the padding is valid, set plaintext_size to the number of
* remaining bytes after stripping the padding. If the padding
* is invalid, avoid leaking this fact through the size of the
* output: use the maximum message size that fits in the output
* buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
* validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
* size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
plaintext_size = if_int( bad,
(unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
(unsigned) ( ilen - pad_count - 3 ) );
*olen = ilen - (p - buf);
memcpy( output, p, *olen );
ret = 0;
/* Set output_too_large to 0 if the plaintext fits in the output
* buffer and to 1 otherwise. */
output_too_large = size_greater_than( plaintext_size,
plaintext_max_size );
/* Set ret without branches to avoid timing attacks. Return:
* - INVALID_PADDING if the padding is bad (bad != 0).
* - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
* plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
* - 0 if the padding is correct. */
ret = - (int) if_int( bad, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING,
if_int( output_too_large, - MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE,
0 ) );
/* If the padding is bad or the plaintext is too large, zero the
* data that we're about to copy to the output buffer.
* We need to copy the same amount of data
* from the same buffer whether the padding is good or not to
* avoid leaking the padding validity through overall timing or
* through memory or cache access patterns. */
bad = all_or_nothing_int( bad | output_too_large );
for( i = 11; i < ilen; i++ )
buf[i] &= ~bad;
/* If the plaintext is too large, truncate it to the buffer size.
* Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
* revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
* for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
plaintext_size = if_int( output_too_large,
(unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
(unsigned) plaintext_size );
/* Move the plaintext to the leftmost position where it can start in
* the working buffer, i.e. make it start plaintext_max_size from
* the end of the buffer. Do this with a memory access trace that
* does not depend on the plaintext size. After this move, the
* starting location of the plaintext is no longer sensitive
* information. */
mem_move_to_left( buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size,
plaintext_max_size,
plaintext_max_size - plaintext_size );
/* Finally copy the decrypted plaintext plus trailing zeros
* into the output buffer. */
memcpy( output, buf + ilen - plaintext_max_size, plaintext_max_size );
/* Report the amount of data we copied to the output buffer. In case
* of errors (bad padding or output too large), the value of *olen
* when this function returns is not specified. Making it equivalent
* to the good case limits the risks of leaking the padding validity. */
*olen = plaintext_size;
cleanup:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) );
@ -1521,7 +1683,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
size_t olen;
unsigned char *p = sig;
unsigned char salt[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned int slen, hlen, offset = 0;
size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0;
int ret;
size_t msb;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
@ -1550,10 +1712,20 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
slen = hlen;
if( olen < hlen + slen + 2 )
/* Calculate the largest possible salt length. Normally this is the hash
* length, which is the maximum length the salt can have. If there is not
* enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is
* that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most
* the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017
* (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */
min_slen = hlen - 2;
if( olen < hlen + min_slen + 2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
else if( olen >= hlen + hlen + 2 )
slen = hlen;
else
slen = olen - hlen - 2;
memset( sig, 0, olen );
@ -1563,7 +1735,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
/* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */
msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1;
p += olen - hlen * 2 - 2;
p += olen - hlen - slen - 2;
*p++ = 0x01;
memcpy( p, salt, slen );
p += slen;

View file

@ -351,15 +351,20 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P,
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
/*
* When generating keys, the strongest security we support aims for an error
* rate of at most 2^-100 and we are aiming for the same certainty here as
* well.
*/
if( f_rng != NULL && P != NULL &&
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( P, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( P, 50, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
if( f_rng != NULL && Q != NULL &&
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( Q, 50, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
goto cleanup;

View file

@ -2320,7 +2320,8 @@ mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphers
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )
{
switch( info->key_exchange )
@ -2330,13 +2331,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE:
return( 1 );
default:
return( 0 );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info )

View file

@ -766,6 +766,10 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
unsigned char offer_compress;
const int *ciphersuites;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
int uses_ec = 0;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client hello" ) );
@ -917,6 +921,11 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %04x",
ciphersuites[i] ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( ciphersuite_info );
#endif
n++;
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ciphersuites[i] );
@ -1010,11 +1019,14 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
if( uses_ec )
{
ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
@ -1076,12 +1088,21 @@ static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl );
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client hello" ) );
return( 0 );
@ -1479,7 +1500,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
buf = ssl->in_msg;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
/* No alert on a read error. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
@ -1742,6 +1763,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA &&
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1;
}
#endif
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
&& comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE
@ -2047,6 +2076,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
(const unsigned char **) p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_read_params" ), ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
@ -2076,7 +2109,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
*
* opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
*/
if( (*p) > end - 2 )
if( end - (*p) < 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
@ -2085,7 +2118,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1];
*p += 2;
if( (*p) > end - len )
if( end - (*p) < (int) len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
@ -2328,7 +2361,15 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing )
{
goto start_processing;
}
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
@ -2365,6 +2406,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing;
start_processing:
#endif
p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
@ -2457,6 +2504,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
size_t params_len = p - params;
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
/*
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
@ -2579,12 +2627,25 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len ) ) != 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(
&ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
}
@ -2635,7 +2696,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( 0 );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
@ -2709,7 +2770,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
* therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that
* regardless of the actual code path.
*/
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n )
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
@ -2787,7 +2848,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
@ -2882,6 +2943,16 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
*/
i = 4;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
{
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret )
goto ecdh_calc_secret;
mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx );
}
#endif
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&n,
&ssl->out_msg[i], 1000,
@ -2889,11 +2960,26 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Q", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Q );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
{
ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = n;
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret;
}
ecdh_calc_secret:
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
n = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->handshake->premaster,
@ -2901,6 +2987,10 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
@ -3063,9 +3153,9 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->state++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
@ -3119,9 +3209,18 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
unsigned int hashlen;
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign )
{
goto sign;
}
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
@ -3153,8 +3252,15 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
/*
* Make an RSA signature of the handshake digests
* Make a signature of the handshake digests
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign;
sign:
#endif
ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
@ -3231,11 +3337,21 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ),
md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, &n,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
@ -3248,9 +3364,9 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->state++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
@ -3276,7 +3392,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse new session ticket" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
@ -3311,8 +3427,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
lifetime = ( msg[0] << 24 ) | ( msg[1] << 16 ) |
( msg[2] << 8 ) | ( msg[3] );
lifetime = ( ((uint32_t) msg[0]) << 24 ) | ( msg[1] << 16 ) |
( msg[2] << 8 ) | ( msg[3] );
ticket_len = ( msg[4] << 8 ) | ( msg[5] );
@ -3390,10 +3506,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used
* by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */

View file

@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@ read_record_header:
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO );
}
memcpy( ssl->out_ctr + 2, ssl->in_ctr + 2, 6 );
memcpy( ssl->cur_out_ctr + 2, ssl->in_ctr + 2, 6 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 )
@ -2384,12 +2384,21 @@ static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello verify request" ) );
return( 0 );
@ -2589,8 +2598,12 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
if ( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) )
{
ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen );
ext_len += olen;
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
@ -2620,7 +2633,7 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO;
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) );
@ -2815,7 +2828,7 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->out_msg[4 + ct_len + sa_len] = (unsigned char)( total_dn_size >> 8 );
ssl->out_msg[5 + ct_len + sa_len] = (unsigned char)( total_dn_size );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate request" ) );
@ -3332,9 +3345,9 @@ static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->state++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
@ -3359,12 +3372,21 @@ static int ssl_write_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl );
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello done" ) );
return( 0 );
@ -3706,7 +3728,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
else
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
@ -4016,25 +4038,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
/* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */
do {
do ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer( ssl );
while( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl );
} while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret ||
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING == ret );
ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 0 /* no checksum update */ );
if( 0 != ret )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type" ), ret );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_read_record" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
@ -4223,9 +4230,9 @@ static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
*/
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
@ -4254,10 +4261,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
switch( ssl->state )
{

View file

@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int ssl_ticket_update_keys( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx )
uint32_t current_time = (uint32_t) mbedtls_time( NULL );
uint32_t key_time = ctx->keys[ctx->active].generation_time;
if( current_time > key_time &&
if( current_time >= key_time &&
current_time - key_time < ctx->ticket_lifetime )
{
return( 0 );

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -19,6 +19,14 @@
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
/*
* Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before
* config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms.
*/
#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE)
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
@ -29,6 +37,36 @@
#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT)
#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \
defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \
defined(__MACH__)))
#include <unistd.h>
#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ ||
* (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */
#if !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \
( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \
_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 20112L ) )
/*
* This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long
* preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in
* platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and
* threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so
* we keep it private by only defining it in this file
*/
#if ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) )
#define THREADING_USE_GMTIME
#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */
#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \
( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \
_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 20112L ) ) */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD)
static void threading_mutex_init_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex )
{
@ -114,6 +152,9 @@ void mbedtls_threading_set_alt( void (*mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
mbedtls_mutex_init( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex );
#endif
#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME)
mbedtls_mutex_init( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex );
#endif
}
/*
@ -124,6 +165,9 @@ void mbedtls_threading_free_alt( void )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
mbedtls_mutex_free( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex );
#endif
#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME)
mbedtls_mutex_free( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex );
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */
@ -136,5 +180,8 @@ void mbedtls_threading_free_alt( void )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex MUTEX_INIT;
#endif
#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME)
mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex MUTEX_INIT;
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */

View file

@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
#include <windows.h>
#include <winbase.h>
#include <process.h>
struct _hr_time
{
@ -267,18 +268,17 @@ unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int
/* It's OK to use a global because alarm() is supposed to be global anyway */
static DWORD alarmMs;
static DWORD WINAPI TimerProc( LPVOID TimerContext )
static void TimerProc( void *TimerContext )
{
((void) TimerContext);
(void) TimerContext;
Sleep( alarmMs );
mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1;
return( TRUE );
/* _endthread will be called implicitly on return
* That ensures execution of thread funcition's epilogue */
}
void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds )
{
DWORD ThreadId;
if( seconds == 0 )
{
/* No need to create a thread for this simple case.
@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds )
mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0;
alarmMs = seconds * 1000;
CloseHandle( CreateThread( NULL, 0, TimerProc, NULL, 0, &ThreadId ) );
(void) _beginthread( TimerProc, 0, NULL );
}
#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */

View file

@ -339,6 +339,9 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
"MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
"MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
"MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */

View file

@ -29,13 +29,6 @@
* http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf
*/
/* Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be included before
* config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. */
#if defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE)
#undef _POSIX_C_SOURCE
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
@ -70,6 +63,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include <time.h>
#endif
@ -904,11 +898,7 @@ static int x509_get_current_time( mbedtls_x509_time *now )
int ret = 0;
tt = mbedtls_time( NULL );
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
lt = gmtime_s( &tm_buf, &tt ) == 0 ? &tm_buf : NULL;
#else
lt = gmtime_r( &tt, &tm_buf );
#endif
lt = mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( &tt, &tm_buf );
if( lt == NULL )
ret = -1;

View file

@ -33,48 +33,84 @@
#include <string.h>
/* Structure linking OIDs for X.509 DN AttributeTypes to their
* string representations and default string encodings used by Mbed TLS. */
typedef struct {
const char *name;
size_t name_len;
const char*oid;
const char *name; /* String representation of AttributeType, e.g.
* "CN" or "emailAddress". */
size_t name_len; /* Length of 'name', without trailing 0 byte. */
const char *oid; /* String representation of OID of AttributeType,
* as per RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */
int default_tag; /* The default character encoding used for the
* given attribute type, e.g.
* MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING for UTF-8. */
} x509_attr_descriptor_t;
#define ADD_STRLEN( s ) s, sizeof( s ) - 1
/* X.509 DN attributes from RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */
static const x509_attr_descriptor_t x509_attrs[] =
{
{ ADD_STRLEN( "CN" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "commonName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "C" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "countryName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "O" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "organizationName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "L" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "locality" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "R" ), MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "OU" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "organizationalUnitName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "ST" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "stateOrProvinceName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "emailAddress" ), MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "serialNumber" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "postalAddress" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "postalCode" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "dnQualifier" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "title" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "surName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "SN" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "givenName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "GN" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "initials" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "pseudonym" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "generationQualifier" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "domainComponent" ), MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "DC" ), MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT },
{ NULL, 0, NULL }
{ ADD_STRLEN( "CN" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "commonName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "C" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "countryName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "O" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "organizationName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "L" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "locality" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "R" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "OU" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "organizationalUnitName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "ST" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "stateOrProvinceName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "emailAddress" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "serialNumber" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "postalAddress" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "postalCode" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "dnQualifier" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "title" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "surName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "SN" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "givenName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "GN" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "initials" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "pseudonym" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "generationQualifier" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "domainComponent" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "DC" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING },
{ NULL, 0, NULL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL }
};
static const char *x509_at_oid_from_name( const char *name, size_t name_len )
static const x509_attr_descriptor_t *x509_attr_descr_from_name( const char *name, size_t name_len )
{
const x509_attr_descriptor_t *cur;
@ -83,7 +119,10 @@ static const char *x509_at_oid_from_name( const char *name, size_t name_len )
strncmp( cur->name, name, name_len ) == 0 )
break;
return( cur->oid );
if ( cur->name == NULL )
return( NULL );
return( cur );
}
int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name )
@ -92,6 +131,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *na
const char *s = name, *c = s;
const char *end = s + strlen( s );
const char *oid = NULL;
const x509_attr_descriptor_t* attr_descr = NULL;
int in_tag = 1;
char data[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE];
char *d = data;
@ -103,12 +143,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *na
{
if( in_tag && *c == '=' )
{
if( ( oid = x509_at_oid_from_name( s, c - s ) ) == NULL )
if( ( attr_descr = x509_attr_descr_from_name( s, c - s ) ) == NULL )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID;
goto exit;
}
oid = attr_descr->oid;
s = c + 1;
in_tag = 0;
d = data;
@ -127,13 +168,19 @@ int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *na
}
else if( !in_tag && ( *c == ',' || c == end ) )
{
if( mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( head, oid, strlen( oid ),
(unsigned char *) data,
d - data ) == NULL )
mbedtls_asn1_named_data* cur =
mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( head, oid, strlen( oid ),
(unsigned char *) data,
d - data );
if(cur == NULL )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
}
// set tagType
cur->val.tag = attr_descr->default_tag;
while( c < end && *(c + 1) == ' ' )
c++;
@ -192,46 +239,40 @@ int mbedtls_x509_set_extension( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid,
*
* AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType
*/
static int x509_write_name( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
const unsigned char *name, size_t name_len )
static int x509_write_name( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data* cur_name)
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
const char *oid = (const char*)cur_name->oid.p;
size_t oid_len = cur_name->oid.len;
const unsigned char *name = cur_name->val.p;
size_t name_len = cur_name->val.len;
// Write PrintableString for all except MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL
//
if( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL ) == oid_len &&
memcmp( oid, MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, oid_len ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( p, start,
(const char *) name,
name_len ) );
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( p, start,
(const char *) name,
name_len ) );
}
// Write correct string tag and value
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( p, start,
cur_name->val.tag,
(const char *) name,
name_len ) );
// Write OID
//
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( p, start, oid, oid_len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( p, start, oid,
oid_len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) );
return( (int) len );
}
int mbedtls_x509_write_names( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first )
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
@ -239,9 +280,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_write_names( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
while( cur != NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, x509_write_name( p, start, (char *) cur->oid.p,
cur->oid.len,
cur->val.p, cur->val.len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, x509_write_name( p, start, cur ) );
cur = cur->next;
}

View file

@ -43,7 +43,6 @@
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
@ -53,6 +52,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#define mbedtls_free free
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb =
static int x509_profile_check_md_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
return( -1 );
if( ( profile->allowed_mds & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( md_alg ) ) != 0 )
return( 0 );
@ -176,6 +179,9 @@ static int x509_profile_check_md_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg )
{
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
return( -1 );
if( ( profile->allowed_pks & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( pk_alg ) ) != 0 )
return( 0 );
@ -208,6 +214,9 @@ static int x509_profile_check_key( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
{
const mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id;
if( gid == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE )
return( -1 );
if( ( profile->allowed_curves & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( gid ) ) != 0 )
return( 0 );
@ -218,6 +227,153 @@ static int x509_profile_check_key( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
return( -1 );
}
/*
* Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different
*/
static int x509_memcasecmp( const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len )
{
size_t i;
unsigned char diff;
const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2;
for( i = 0; i < len; i++ )
{
diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i];
if( diff == 0 )
continue;
if( diff == 32 &&
( ( n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z' ) ||
( n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z' ) ) )
{
continue;
}
return( -1 );
}
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise
*/
static int x509_check_wildcard( const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name )
{
size_t i;
size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen( cn );
/* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */
if( name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.' )
return( -1 );
for( i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i )
{
if( cn[i] == '.' )
{
cn_idx = i;
break;
}
}
if( cn_idx == 0 )
return( -1 );
if( cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 &&
x509_memcasecmp( name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1 ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
return( -1 );
}
/*
* Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding
* variations (but not all).
*
* Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
*/
static int x509_string_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b )
{
if( a->tag == b->tag &&
a->len == b->len &&
memcmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
if( ( a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) &&
( b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) &&
a->len == b->len &&
x509_memcasecmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
return( -1 );
}
/*
* Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence).
*
* See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm:
* we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal,
* but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation
* or space folding.)
*
* Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
*/
static int x509_name_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b )
{
/* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */
while( a != NULL || b != NULL )
{
if( a == NULL || b == NULL )
return( -1 );
/* type */
if( a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag ||
a->oid.len != b->oid.len ||
memcmp( a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len ) != 0 )
{
return( -1 );
}
/* value */
if( x509_string_cmp( &a->val, &b->val ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
/* structure of the list of sets */
if( a->next_merged != b->next_merged )
return( -1 );
a = a->next;
b = b->next;
}
/* a == NULL == b */
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain
*/
static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain )
{
size_t i;
for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++ )
{
ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL;
ver_chain->items[i].flags = -1;
}
ver_chain->len = 0;
}
/*
* Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
*/
@ -570,18 +726,14 @@ static int x509_get_crt_ext( unsigned char **p,
end_ext_data = *p + len;
/* Get extension ID */
extn_oid.tag = **p;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end, &extn_oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( p, end_ext_data, &extn_oid.len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );
extn_oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
extn_oid.p = *p;
*p += extn_oid.len;
if( ( end - *p ) < 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA );
/* Get optional critical */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool( p, end_ext_data, &is_critical ) ) != 0 &&
( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ) )
@ -1662,9 +1814,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca,
while( crl_list != NULL )
{
if( crl_list->version == 0 ||
crl_list->issuer_raw.len != ca->subject_raw.len ||
memcmp( crl_list->issuer_raw.p, ca->subject_raw.p,
crl_list->issuer_raw.len ) != 0 )
x509_name_cmp( &crl_list->issuer, &ca->subject ) != 0 )
{
crl_list = crl_list->next;
continue;
@ -1674,7 +1824,8 @@ static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca,
* Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)
if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( ca, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN ) != 0 )
if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( ca,
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN ) != 0 )
{
flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
break;
@ -1734,141 +1885,12 @@ static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca,
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */
/*
* Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different
*/
static int x509_memcasecmp( const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len )
{
size_t i;
unsigned char diff;
const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2;
for( i = 0; i < len; i++ )
{
diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i];
if( diff == 0 )
continue;
if( diff == 32 &&
( ( n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z' ) ||
( n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z' ) ) )
{
continue;
}
return( -1 );
}
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise
*/
static int x509_check_wildcard( const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name )
{
size_t i;
size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen( cn );
/* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */
if( name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.' )
return( -1 );
for( i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i )
{
if( cn[i] == '.' )
{
cn_idx = i;
break;
}
}
if( cn_idx == 0 )
return( -1 );
if( cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 &&
x509_memcasecmp( name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1 ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
return( -1 );
}
/*
* Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding
* variations (but not all).
*
* Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
*/
static int x509_string_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b )
{
if( a->tag == b->tag &&
a->len == b->len &&
memcmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
if( ( a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) &&
( b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) &&
a->len == b->len &&
x509_memcasecmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
return( -1 );
}
/*
* Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence).
*
* See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm:
* we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal,
* but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation
* or space folding.)
*
* Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
*/
static int x509_name_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b )
{
/* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */
while( a != NULL || b != NULL )
{
if( a == NULL || b == NULL )
return( -1 );
/* type */
if( a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag ||
a->oid.len != b->oid.len ||
memcmp( a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len ) != 0 )
{
return( -1 );
}
/* value */
if( x509_string_cmp( &a->val, &b->val ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
/* structure of the list of sets */
if( a->next_merged != b->next_merged )
return( -1 );
a = a->next;
b = b->next;
}
/* a == NULL == b */
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Check the signature of a certificate by its parent
*/
static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent )
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
@ -1880,14 +1902,24 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
return( -1 );
}
if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
/* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) )
return( -1 );
}
return( 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA )
{
return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk ) );
}
#else
(void) rs_ctx;
#endif
return( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) );
}
/*
@ -1934,6 +1966,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
* 1. subject name matches child's issuer
* 2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs
* 3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct
* (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported)
* 4. pathlen constraints are satisfied
*
* If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first
@ -1956,23 +1989,54 @@ static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
* Arguments:
* - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent
* - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents
* - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL)
* - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0
* - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top
* of the chain, 0 otherwise
* - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far
* - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far
* (will never be greater than path_cnt)
* - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
*
* Return value:
* - the first suitable parent found (see above regarding time-validity)
* - NULL if no suitable parent was found
* - 0 on success
* - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
*/
static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent_in( mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates,
int top,
size_t path_cnt,
size_t self_cnt )
static int x509_crt_find_parent_in(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates,
mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent,
int *r_signature_is_good,
int top,
unsigned path_cnt,
unsigned self_cnt,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *badtime_parent = NULL;
int ret;
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent;
int signature_is_good, fallback_signature_is_good;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* did we have something in progress? */
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent != NULL )
{
/* restore saved state */
parent = rs_ctx->parent;
fallback_parent = rs_ctx->fallback_parent;
fallback_signature_is_good = rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good;
/* clear saved state */
rs_ctx->parent = NULL;
rs_ctx->fallback_parent = NULL;
rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
/* resume where we left */
goto check_signature;
}
#endif
fallback_parent = NULL;
fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
for( parent = candidates; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next )
{
@ -1988,17 +2052,38 @@ static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent_in( mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
}
/* Signature */
if( top && x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent ) != 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
check_signature:
#endif
ret = x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent, rs_ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
{
continue;
/* save state */
rs_ctx->parent = parent;
rs_ctx->fallback_parent = fallback_parent;
rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good;
return( ret );
}
#else
(void) ret;
#endif
signature_is_good = ret == 0;
if( top && ! signature_is_good )
continue;
/* optional time check */
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &parent->valid_to ) ||
mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &parent->valid_from ) )
{
if( badtime_parent == NULL )
badtime_parent = parent;
if( fallback_parent == NULL )
{
fallback_parent = parent;
fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;
}
continue;
}
@ -2006,10 +2091,18 @@ static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent_in( mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
break;
}
if( parent == NULL )
parent = badtime_parent;
if( parent != NULL )
{
*r_parent = parent;
*r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;
}
else
{
*r_parent = fallback_parent;
*r_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good;
}
return( parent );
return( 0 );
}
/*
@ -2021,34 +2114,78 @@ static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent_in( mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
* Arguments:
* - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed
* by a chain of possible intermediates
* - [in] trust_ca: locally trusted CAs
* - [out] 1 if parent was found in trust_ca, 0 if found in provided chain
* - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far
* - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far
* - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates
* - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL)
* - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0
* - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0
* - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child)
* - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far
* (will always be no greater than path_cnt)
* - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
*
* Return value:
* - the first suitable parent found (see find_parent_in() for "suitable")
* - NULL if no suitable parent was found
* - 0 on success
* - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
*/
static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent( mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
int *parent_is_trusted,
size_t path_cnt,
size_t self_cnt )
static int x509_crt_find_parent(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crt **parent,
int *parent_is_trusted,
int *signature_is_good,
unsigned path_cnt,
unsigned self_cnt,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
int ret;
mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list;
/* Look for a parent in trusted CAs */
*parent_is_trusted = 1;
parent = x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, trust_ca, 1, path_cnt, self_cnt );
if( parent != NULL )
return( parent );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted != -1 )
{
*parent_is_trusted = rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted;
rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1;
}
#endif
/* Look for a parent upwards the chain */
*parent_is_trusted = 0;
return( x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, child->next, 0, path_cnt, self_cnt ) );
while( 1 ) {
search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next;
ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, search_list,
parent, signature_is_good,
*parent_is_trusted,
path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
{
/* save state */
rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = *parent_is_trusted;
return( ret );
}
#else
(void) ret;
#endif
/* stop here if found or already in second iteration */
if( *parent != NULL || *parent_is_trusted == 0 )
break;
/* prepare second iteration */
*parent_is_trusted = 0;
}
/* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */
if( parent == NULL )
{
*parent_is_trusted = 0;
*signature_is_good = 0;
}
return( 0 );
}
/*
@ -2097,11 +2234,24 @@ static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
* - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root
* -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq
*
* Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least:
* - trusted EE
* - EE -> trusted root
* - EE -> intermedate CA -> trusted root
* - if relevant: EE untrusted
* - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted
* with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root).
* For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is
* enough (but length 1 is not in general).
*
* Arguments:
* - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn
* - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp
* - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile()
* - [out] ver_chain, chain_len: the built and verified chain
* - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain
* Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise!
* Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume.
* - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
*
* Return value:
* - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined
@ -2113,24 +2263,50 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE],
size_t *chain_len )
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
/* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can
* catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */
int ret;
uint32_t *flags;
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
mbedtls_x509_crt *child;
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
int parent_is_trusted = 0;
int child_is_trusted = 0;
size_t self_cnt = 0;
int parent_is_trusted;
int child_is_trusted;
int signature_is_good;
unsigned self_cnt;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* resume if we had an operation in progress */
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->in_progress == x509_crt_rs_find_parent )
{
/* restore saved state */
*ver_chain = rs_ctx->ver_chain; /* struct copy */
self_cnt = rs_ctx->self_cnt;
/* restore derived state */
cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1];
child = cur->crt;
flags = &cur->flags;
goto find_parent;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
child = crt;
*chain_len = 0;
self_cnt = 0;
parent_is_trusted = 0;
child_is_trusted = 0;
while( 1 ) {
/* Add certificate to the verification chain */
ver_chain[*chain_len].crt = child;
flags = &ver_chain[*chain_len].flags;
++*chain_len;
cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len];
cur->crt = child;
cur->flags = 0;
ver_chain->len++;
flags = &cur->flags;
/* Check time-validity (all certificates) */
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) )
@ -2151,15 +2327,33 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
/* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */
if( *chain_len == 1 &&
if( ver_chain->len == 1 &&
x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
find_parent:
#endif
/* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */
parent = x509_crt_find_parent( child, trust_ca, &parent_is_trusted,
*chain_len - 1, self_cnt );
ret = x509_crt_find_parent( child, trust_ca, &parent,
&parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good,
ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
{
/* save state */
rs_ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_find_parent;
rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt;
rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */
return( ret );
}
#else
(void) ret;
#endif
/* No parent? We're done here */
if( parent == NULL )
@ -2171,7 +2365,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
/* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs.
* These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO],
* and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */
if( *chain_len != 1 &&
if( ver_chain->len != 1 &&
x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 )
{
self_cnt++;
@ -2180,14 +2374,14 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
/* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA,
* and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */
if( ! parent_is_trusted &&
*chain_len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
{
/* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
}
/* if parent is trusted, the signature was checked by find_parent() */
if( ! parent_is_trusted && x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent ) != 0 )
/* signature was checked while searching parent */
if( ! signature_is_good )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
/* check size of signing key */
@ -2205,6 +2399,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
child = parent;
parent = NULL;
child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted;
signature_is_good = 0;
}
}
@ -2273,21 +2468,22 @@ static void x509_crt_verify_name( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
*/
static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(
uint32_t *flags,
x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE],
size_t chain_len,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
int ret;
size_t i;
unsigned i;
uint32_t cur_flags;
const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
for( i = chain_len; i != 0; --i )
for( i = ver_chain->len; i != 0; --i )
{
cur_flags = ver_chain[i-1].flags;
cur = &ver_chain->items[i-1];
cur_flags = cur->flags;
if( NULL != f_vrfy )
if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, ver_chain[i-1].crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, cur->crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
*flags |= cur_flags;
@ -2297,7 +2493,7 @@ static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(
}
/*
* Verify the certificate validity
* Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable)
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
@ -2306,19 +2502,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
return( mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
&mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, cn, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ) );
return( mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
&mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, cn, flags,
f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) );
}
/*
* Verify the certificate validity, with profile
*
* This function:
* - checks the requested CN (if any)
* - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key,
* as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently
* - builds and verifies the chain
* - then calls the callback and merges the flags
* Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable)
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
@ -2327,16 +2517,38 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
return( mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
profile, cn, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) );
}
/*
* Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version
*
* This function:
* - checks the requested CN (if any)
* - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key,
* as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently
* - builds and verifies the chain
* - then calls the callback and merges the flags
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE];
size_t chain_len;
uint32_t *ee_flags = &ver_chain[0].flags;
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain;
uint32_t ee_flags;
*flags = 0;
memset( ver_chain, 0, sizeof( ver_chain ) );
chain_len = 0;
ee_flags = 0;
x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ver_chain );
if( profile == NULL )
{
@ -2346,28 +2558,36 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
/* check name if requested */
if( cn != NULL )
x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, ee_flags );
x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, &ee_flags );
/* Check the type and size of the key */
pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk );
if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 )
*ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &crt->pk ) != 0 )
*ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
/* Check the chain */
ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
ver_chain, &chain_len );
&ver_chain, rs_ctx );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
/* Merge end-entity flags */
ver_chain.items[0].flags |= ee_flags;
/* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */
ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( flags,
ver_chain, chain_len, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
exit:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( rs_ctx );
#endif
/* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by
* the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the
* callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */
@ -2478,4 +2698,36 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )
while( cert_cur != NULL );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Initialize a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
mbedtls_pk_restart_init( &ctx->pk );
ctx->parent = NULL;
ctx->fallback_parent = NULL;
ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1;
ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_none;
ctx->self_cnt = 0;
x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ctx->ver_chain );
}
/*
* Free the components of a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
mbedtls_pk_restart_free( &ctx->pk );
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( ctx );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */