zephyr/subsys/bluetooth/mesh/crypto.c

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/* Bluetooth Mesh */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017 Intel Corporation
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <toolchain.h>
#include <zephyr/types.h>
#include <sys/byteorder.h>
#include <sys/util.h>
#include <tinycrypt/constants.h>
#include <tinycrypt/utils.h>
#include <tinycrypt/aes.h>
#include <tinycrypt/cmac_mode.h>
#include <tinycrypt/ccm_mode.h>
#include <bluetooth/mesh.h>
#include <bluetooth/crypto.h>
#define BT_DBG_ENABLED IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_MESH_DEBUG_CRYPTO)
#define LOG_MODULE_NAME bt_mesh_crypto
#include "common/log.h"
#include "mesh.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#define NET_MIC_LEN(pdu) (((pdu)[1] & 0x80) ? 8 : 4)
Bluetooth: Mesh: Fix model publication Model publication was broken in a couple of ways: - The Publish Retransmit State was not taken into account at all - Health Server used a single publish state for all elements To implement Publish Retransmit properly, one has to use a callback to track when the message has been sent. The problem with the transport layer sending APIs was that giving a callback would cause the transport layer to assume that segmentation (with acks) is desired, which is not the case for Model Publication (unless the message itself is too large, of course). Because of this, the message sending context receives a new send_rel ("Send Reliable") boolean member that an app can use to force reliable sending. Another challenge with the Publish Retransmit state is that a buffer is needed for storing the AppKey-encrypted SDU once it has been sent out for the first time.To solve this, a new new net_buf_simple member is added to the model publication context. The separate 'msg' input parameter of the bt_mesh_model_publish() API is removed, since the application is now expected to pre-fill pub->msg instead. To help with the publishing API change, the Health Server model gets a new helper macro for initializing the publishing context with a right-sized publishing message. The API for creating Health Server instances is also redesigned since it was so far using a single model publishing state, which would result in erratic behavior in case of multiple elements with the Health Server Model. Now, the application needs to provide a unique publishing context for each Health Server instance. The changes are heavily intertwined, so it's not easily possible to split them into multiple patches, hence the large(ish) patch. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2017-11-18 09:24:18 +01:00
#define APP_MIC_LEN(aszmic) ((aszmic) ? 8 : 4)
int bt_mesh_aes_cmac(const uint8_t key[16], struct bt_mesh_sg *sg,
size_t sg_len, uint8_t mac[16])
{
struct tc_aes_key_sched_struct sched;
struct tc_cmac_struct state;
if (tc_cmac_setup(&state, key, &sched) == TC_CRYPTO_FAIL) {
return -EIO;
}
for (; sg_len; sg_len--, sg++) {
if (tc_cmac_update(&state, sg->data,
sg->len) == TC_CRYPTO_FAIL) {
return -EIO;
}
}
if (tc_cmac_final(mac, &state) == TC_CRYPTO_FAIL) {
return -EIO;
}
return 0;
}
int bt_mesh_k1(const uint8_t *ikm, size_t ikm_len, const uint8_t salt[16],
const char *info, uint8_t okm[16])
{
int err;
err = bt_mesh_aes_cmac_one(salt, ikm, ikm_len, okm);
if (err < 0) {
return err;
}
return bt_mesh_aes_cmac_one(okm, info, strlen(info), okm);
}
int bt_mesh_k2(const uint8_t n[16], const uint8_t *p, size_t p_len,
uint8_t net_id[1], uint8_t enc_key[16], uint8_t priv_key[16])
{
struct bt_mesh_sg sg[3];
uint8_t salt[16];
uint8_t out[16];
uint8_t t[16];
uint8_t pad;
int err;
BT_DBG("n %s", bt_hex(n, 16));
BT_DBG("p %s", bt_hex(p, p_len));
err = bt_mesh_s1("smk2", salt);
if (err) {
return err;
}
err = bt_mesh_aes_cmac_one(salt, n, 16, t);
if (err) {
return err;
}
pad = 0x01;
sg[0].data = NULL;
sg[0].len = 0;
sg[1].data = p;
sg[1].len = p_len;
sg[2].data = &pad;
sg[2].len = sizeof(pad);
err = bt_mesh_aes_cmac(t, sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg), out);
if (err) {
return err;
}
net_id[0] = out[15] & 0x7f;
sg[0].data = out;
sg[0].len = sizeof(out);
pad = 0x02;
err = bt_mesh_aes_cmac(t, sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg), out);
if (err) {
return err;
}
memcpy(enc_key, out, 16);
pad = 0x03;
err = bt_mesh_aes_cmac(t, sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg), out);
if (err) {
return err;
}
memcpy(priv_key, out, 16);
BT_DBG("NID 0x%02x enc_key %s", net_id[0], bt_hex(enc_key, 16));
BT_DBG("priv_key %s", bt_hex(priv_key, 16));
return 0;
}
int bt_mesh_k3(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t out[8])
{
uint8_t id64[] = { 'i', 'd', '6', '4', 0x01 };
uint8_t tmp[16];
uint8_t t[16];
int err;
err = bt_mesh_s1("smk3", tmp);
if (err) {
return err;
}
err = bt_mesh_aes_cmac_one(tmp, n, 16, t);
if (err) {
return err;
}
err = bt_mesh_aes_cmac_one(t, id64, sizeof(id64), tmp);
if (err) {
return err;
}
memcpy(out, tmp + 8, 8);
return 0;
}
int bt_mesh_k4(const uint8_t n[16], uint8_t out[1])
{
uint8_t id6[] = { 'i', 'd', '6', 0x01 };
uint8_t tmp[16];
uint8_t t[16];
int err;
err = bt_mesh_s1("smk4", tmp);
if (err) {
return err;
}
err = bt_mesh_aes_cmac_one(tmp, n, 16, t);
if (err) {
return err;
}
err = bt_mesh_aes_cmac_one(t, id6, sizeof(id6), tmp);
if (err) {
return err;
}
out[0] = tmp[15] & BIT_MASK(6);
return 0;
}
int bt_mesh_id128(const uint8_t n[16], const char *s, uint8_t out[16])
{
const char *id128 = "id128\x01";
uint8_t salt[16];
int err;
err = bt_mesh_s1(s, salt);
if (err) {
return err;
}
return bt_mesh_k1(n, 16, salt, id128, out);
}
static void create_proxy_nonce(uint8_t nonce[13], const uint8_t *pdu,
uint32_t iv_index)
{
/* Nonce Type */
nonce[0] = 0x03;
/* Pad */
nonce[1] = 0x00;
/* Sequence Number */
nonce[2] = pdu[2];
nonce[3] = pdu[3];
nonce[4] = pdu[4];
/* Source Address */
nonce[5] = pdu[5];
nonce[6] = pdu[6];
/* Pad */
nonce[7] = 0U;
nonce[8] = 0U;
/* IV Index */
sys_put_be32(iv_index, &nonce[9]);
}
static void create_net_nonce(uint8_t nonce[13], const uint8_t *pdu,
uint32_t iv_index)
{
/* Nonce Type */
nonce[0] = 0x00;
/* FRND + TTL */
nonce[1] = pdu[1];
/* Sequence Number */
nonce[2] = pdu[2];
nonce[3] = pdu[3];
nonce[4] = pdu[4];
/* Source Address */
nonce[5] = pdu[5];
nonce[6] = pdu[6];
/* Pad */
nonce[7] = 0U;
nonce[8] = 0U;
/* IV Index */
sys_put_be32(iv_index, &nonce[9]);
}
int bt_mesh_net_obfuscate(uint8_t *pdu, uint32_t iv_index,
const uint8_t privacy_key[16])
{
uint8_t priv_rand[16] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, };
uint8_t tmp[16];
int err, i;
BT_DBG("IVIndex %u, PrivacyKey %s", iv_index, bt_hex(privacy_key, 16));
sys_put_be32(iv_index, &priv_rand[5]);
memcpy(&priv_rand[9], &pdu[7], 7);
BT_DBG("PrivacyRandom %s", bt_hex(priv_rand, 16));
err = bt_encrypt_be(privacy_key, priv_rand, tmp);
if (err) {
return err;
}
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
pdu[1 + i] ^= tmp[i];
}
return 0;
}
int bt_mesh_net_encrypt(const uint8_t key[16], struct net_buf_simple *buf,
uint32_t iv_index, bool proxy)
{
uint8_t mic_len = NET_MIC_LEN(buf->data);
uint8_t nonce[13];
int err;
BT_DBG("IVIndex %u EncKey %s mic_len %u", iv_index, bt_hex(key, 16),
mic_len);
BT_DBG("PDU (len %u) %s", buf->len, bt_hex(buf->data, buf->len));
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_MESH_PROXY) && proxy) {
create_proxy_nonce(nonce, buf->data, iv_index);
} else {
create_net_nonce(nonce, buf->data, iv_index);
}
BT_DBG("Nonce %s", bt_hex(nonce, 13));
err = bt_ccm_encrypt(key, nonce, &buf->data[7], buf->len - 7, NULL, 0,
&buf->data[7], mic_len);
if (!err) {
net_buf_simple_add(buf, mic_len);
}
return err;
}
int bt_mesh_net_decrypt(const uint8_t key[16], struct net_buf_simple *buf,
uint32_t iv_index, bool proxy)
{
uint8_t mic_len = NET_MIC_LEN(buf->data);
uint8_t nonce[13];
BT_DBG("PDU (%u bytes) %s", buf->len, bt_hex(buf->data, buf->len));
BT_DBG("iv_index %u, key %s mic_len %u", iv_index, bt_hex(key, 16),
mic_len);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_MESH_PROXY) && proxy) {
create_proxy_nonce(nonce, buf->data, iv_index);
} else {
create_net_nonce(nonce, buf->data, iv_index);
}
BT_DBG("Nonce %s", bt_hex(nonce, 13));
buf->len -= mic_len;
return bt_ccm_decrypt(key, nonce, &buf->data[7], buf->len - 7, NULL, 0,
&buf->data[7], mic_len);
}
static void create_app_nonce(uint8_t nonce[13], bool dev_key, uint8_t aszmic,
uint16_t src, uint16_t dst, uint32_t seq_num,
uint32_t iv_index)
{
if (dev_key) {
nonce[0] = 0x02;
} else {
nonce[0] = 0x01;
}
sys_put_be32((seq_num | ((uint32_t)aszmic << 31)), &nonce[1]);
sys_put_be16(src, &nonce[5]);
sys_put_be16(dst, &nonce[7]);
sys_put_be32(iv_index, &nonce[9]);
}
int bt_mesh_app_encrypt(const uint8_t key[16], bool dev_key, uint8_t aszmic,
struct net_buf_simple *buf, const uint8_t *ad,
uint16_t src, uint16_t dst, uint32_t seq_num, uint32_t iv_index)
{
uint8_t nonce[13];
int err;
BT_DBG("AppKey %s", bt_hex(key, 16));
Bluetooth: Mesh: Fix model publication Model publication was broken in a couple of ways: - The Publish Retransmit State was not taken into account at all - Health Server used a single publish state for all elements To implement Publish Retransmit properly, one has to use a callback to track when the message has been sent. The problem with the transport layer sending APIs was that giving a callback would cause the transport layer to assume that segmentation (with acks) is desired, which is not the case for Model Publication (unless the message itself is too large, of course). Because of this, the message sending context receives a new send_rel ("Send Reliable") boolean member that an app can use to force reliable sending. Another challenge with the Publish Retransmit state is that a buffer is needed for storing the AppKey-encrypted SDU once it has been sent out for the first time.To solve this, a new new net_buf_simple member is added to the model publication context. The separate 'msg' input parameter of the bt_mesh_model_publish() API is removed, since the application is now expected to pre-fill pub->msg instead. To help with the publishing API change, the Health Server model gets a new helper macro for initializing the publishing context with a right-sized publishing message. The API for creating Health Server instances is also redesigned since it was so far using a single model publishing state, which would result in erratic behavior in case of multiple elements with the Health Server Model. Now, the application needs to provide a unique publishing context for each Health Server instance. The changes are heavily intertwined, so it's not easily possible to split them into multiple patches, hence the large(ish) patch. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2017-11-18 09:24:18 +01:00
BT_DBG("dev_key %u src 0x%04x dst 0x%04x", dev_key, src, dst);
BT_DBG("seq_num 0x%08x iv_index 0x%08x", seq_num, iv_index);
BT_DBG("Clear: %s", bt_hex(buf->data, buf->len));
create_app_nonce(nonce, dev_key, aszmic, src, dst, seq_num, iv_index);
BT_DBG("Nonce %s", bt_hex(nonce, 13));
err = bt_ccm_encrypt(key, nonce, buf->data, buf->len, ad, ad ? 16 : 0,
buf->data, APP_MIC_LEN(aszmic));
if (!err) {
Bluetooth: Mesh: Fix model publication Model publication was broken in a couple of ways: - The Publish Retransmit State was not taken into account at all - Health Server used a single publish state for all elements To implement Publish Retransmit properly, one has to use a callback to track when the message has been sent. The problem with the transport layer sending APIs was that giving a callback would cause the transport layer to assume that segmentation (with acks) is desired, which is not the case for Model Publication (unless the message itself is too large, of course). Because of this, the message sending context receives a new send_rel ("Send Reliable") boolean member that an app can use to force reliable sending. Another challenge with the Publish Retransmit state is that a buffer is needed for storing the AppKey-encrypted SDU once it has been sent out for the first time.To solve this, a new new net_buf_simple member is added to the model publication context. The separate 'msg' input parameter of the bt_mesh_model_publish() API is removed, since the application is now expected to pre-fill pub->msg instead. To help with the publishing API change, the Health Server model gets a new helper macro for initializing the publishing context with a right-sized publishing message. The API for creating Health Server instances is also redesigned since it was so far using a single model publishing state, which would result in erratic behavior in case of multiple elements with the Health Server Model. Now, the application needs to provide a unique publishing context for each Health Server instance. The changes are heavily intertwined, so it's not easily possible to split them into multiple patches, hence the large(ish) patch. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2017-11-18 09:24:18 +01:00
net_buf_simple_add(buf, APP_MIC_LEN(aszmic));
BT_DBG("Encr: %s", bt_hex(buf->data, buf->len));
}
return err;
}
int bt_mesh_app_decrypt(const uint8_t key[16], bool dev_key, uint8_t aszmic,
Bluetooth: Mesh: Fix model publication Model publication was broken in a couple of ways: - The Publish Retransmit State was not taken into account at all - Health Server used a single publish state for all elements To implement Publish Retransmit properly, one has to use a callback to track when the message has been sent. The problem with the transport layer sending APIs was that giving a callback would cause the transport layer to assume that segmentation (with acks) is desired, which is not the case for Model Publication (unless the message itself is too large, of course). Because of this, the message sending context receives a new send_rel ("Send Reliable") boolean member that an app can use to force reliable sending. Another challenge with the Publish Retransmit state is that a buffer is needed for storing the AppKey-encrypted SDU once it has been sent out for the first time.To solve this, a new new net_buf_simple member is added to the model publication context. The separate 'msg' input parameter of the bt_mesh_model_publish() API is removed, since the application is now expected to pre-fill pub->msg instead. To help with the publishing API change, the Health Server model gets a new helper macro for initializing the publishing context with a right-sized publishing message. The API for creating Health Server instances is also redesigned since it was so far using a single model publishing state, which would result in erratic behavior in case of multiple elements with the Health Server Model. Now, the application needs to provide a unique publishing context for each Health Server instance. The changes are heavily intertwined, so it's not easily possible to split them into multiple patches, hence the large(ish) patch. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
2017-11-18 09:24:18 +01:00
struct net_buf_simple *buf, struct net_buf_simple *out,
const uint8_t *ad, uint16_t src, uint16_t dst, uint32_t seq_num,
uint32_t iv_index)
{
uint8_t nonce[13];
int err;
BT_DBG("EncData (len %u) %s", buf->len, bt_hex(buf->data, buf->len));
create_app_nonce(nonce, dev_key, aszmic, src, dst, seq_num, iv_index);
BT_DBG("AppKey %s", bt_hex(key, 16));
BT_DBG("Nonce %s", bt_hex(nonce, 13));
err = bt_ccm_decrypt(key, nonce, buf->data, buf->len, ad, ad ? 16 : 0,
out->data, APP_MIC_LEN(aszmic));
if (!err) {
net_buf_simple_add(out, buf->len);
}
return err;
}
/* reversed, 8-bit, poly=0x07 */
static const uint8_t crc_table[256] = {
0x00, 0x91, 0xe3, 0x72, 0x07, 0x96, 0xe4, 0x75,
0x0e, 0x9f, 0xed, 0x7c, 0x09, 0x98, 0xea, 0x7b,
0x1c, 0x8d, 0xff, 0x6e, 0x1b, 0x8a, 0xf8, 0x69,
0x12, 0x83, 0xf1, 0x60, 0x15, 0x84, 0xf6, 0x67,
0x38, 0xa9, 0xdb, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0xae, 0xdc, 0x4d,
0x36, 0xa7, 0xd5, 0x44, 0x31, 0xa0, 0xd2, 0x43,
0x24, 0xb5, 0xc7, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb2, 0xc0, 0x51,
0x2a, 0xbb, 0xc9, 0x58, 0x2d, 0xbc, 0xce, 0x5f,
0x70, 0xe1, 0x93, 0x02, 0x77, 0xe6, 0x94, 0x05,
0x7e, 0xef, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0x79, 0xe8, 0x9a, 0x0b,
0x6c, 0xfd, 0x8f, 0x1e, 0x6b, 0xfa, 0x88, 0x19,
0x62, 0xf3, 0x81, 0x10, 0x65, 0xf4, 0x86, 0x17,
0x48, 0xd9, 0xab, 0x3a, 0x4f, 0xde, 0xac, 0x3d,
0x46, 0xd7, 0xa5, 0x34, 0x41, 0xd0, 0xa2, 0x33,
0x54, 0xc5, 0xb7, 0x26, 0x53, 0xc2, 0xb0, 0x21,
0x5a, 0xcb, 0xb9, 0x28, 0x5d, 0xcc, 0xbe, 0x2f,
0xe0, 0x71, 0x03, 0x92, 0xe7, 0x76, 0x04, 0x95,
0xee, 0x7f, 0x0d, 0x9c, 0xe9, 0x78, 0x0a, 0x9b,
0xfc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x8e, 0xfb, 0x6a, 0x18, 0x89,
0xf2, 0x63, 0x11, 0x80, 0xf5, 0x64, 0x16, 0x87,
0xd8, 0x49, 0x3b, 0xaa, 0xdf, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0xad,
0xd6, 0x47, 0x35, 0xa4, 0xd1, 0x40, 0x32, 0xa3,
0xc4, 0x55, 0x27, 0xb6, 0xc3, 0x52, 0x20, 0xb1,
0xca, 0x5b, 0x29, 0xb8, 0xcd, 0x5c, 0x2e, 0xbf,
0x90, 0x01, 0x73, 0xe2, 0x97, 0x06, 0x74, 0xe5,
0x9e, 0x0f, 0x7d, 0xec, 0x99, 0x08, 0x7a, 0xeb,
0x8c, 0x1d, 0x6f, 0xfe, 0x8b, 0x1a, 0x68, 0xf9,
0x82, 0x13, 0x61, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x14, 0x66, 0xf7,
0xa8, 0x39, 0x4b, 0xda, 0xaf, 0x3e, 0x4c, 0xdd,
0xa6, 0x37, 0x45, 0xd4, 0xa1, 0x30, 0x42, 0xd3,
0xb4, 0x25, 0x57, 0xc6, 0xb3, 0x22, 0x50, 0xc1,
0xba, 0x2b, 0x59, 0xc8, 0xbd, 0x2c, 0x5e, 0xcf
};
uint8_t bt_mesh_fcs_calc(const uint8_t *data, uint8_t data_len)
{
uint8_t fcs = 0xff;
while (data_len--) {
fcs = crc_table[fcs ^ *data++];
}
BT_DBG("fcs 0x%02x", 0xff - fcs);
return 0xff - fcs;
}
bool bt_mesh_fcs_check(struct net_buf_simple *buf, uint8_t received_fcs)
{
const uint8_t *data = buf->data;
uint16_t data_len = buf->len;
uint8_t fcs = 0xff;
while (data_len--) {
fcs = crc_table[fcs ^ *data++];
}
return crc_table[fcs ^ received_fcs] == 0xcf;
}
int bt_mesh_virtual_addr(const uint8_t virtual_label[16], uint16_t *addr)
{
uint8_t salt[16];
uint8_t tmp[16];
int err;
err = bt_mesh_s1("vtad", salt);
if (err) {
return err;
}
err = bt_mesh_aes_cmac_one(salt, virtual_label, 16, tmp);
if (err) {
return err;
}
*addr = (sys_get_be16(&tmp[14]) & 0x3fff) | 0x8000;
return 0;
}
int bt_mesh_prov_conf_salt(const uint8_t conf_inputs[145], uint8_t salt[16])
{
const uint8_t conf_salt_key[16] = { 0 };
return bt_mesh_aes_cmac_one(conf_salt_key, conf_inputs, 145, salt);
}
int bt_mesh_prov_conf_key(const uint8_t dhkey[32], const uint8_t conf_salt[16],
uint8_t conf_key[16])
{
return bt_mesh_k1(dhkey, 32, conf_salt, "prck", conf_key);
}
int bt_mesh_prov_conf(const uint8_t conf_key[16], const uint8_t rand[16],
const uint8_t auth[16], uint8_t conf[16])
{
struct bt_mesh_sg sg[] = { { rand, 16 }, { auth, 16 } };
BT_DBG("ConfirmationKey %s", bt_hex(conf_key, 16));
BT_DBG("RandomDevice %s", bt_hex(rand, 16));
BT_DBG("AuthValue %s", bt_hex(auth, 16));
return bt_mesh_aes_cmac(conf_key, sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg), conf);
}
int bt_mesh_prov_decrypt(const uint8_t key[16], uint8_t nonce[13],
const uint8_t data[25 + 8], uint8_t out[25])
{
return bt_ccm_decrypt(key, nonce, data, 25, NULL, 0, out, 8);
}
int bt_mesh_prov_encrypt(const uint8_t key[16], uint8_t nonce[13],
const uint8_t data[25], uint8_t out[25 + 8])
{
return bt_ccm_encrypt(key, nonce, data, 25, NULL, 0, out, 8);
}
int bt_mesh_beacon_auth(const uint8_t beacon_key[16], uint8_t flags,
const uint8_t net_id[8], uint32_t iv_index,
uint8_t auth[8])
{
uint8_t msg[13], tmp[16];
int err;
BT_DBG("BeaconKey %s", bt_hex(beacon_key, 16));
BT_DBG("NetId %s", bt_hex(net_id, 8));
BT_DBG("IV Index 0x%08x", iv_index);
msg[0] = flags;
memcpy(&msg[1], net_id, 8);
sys_put_be32(iv_index, &msg[9]);
BT_DBG("BeaconMsg %s", bt_hex(msg, sizeof(msg)));
err = bt_mesh_aes_cmac_one(beacon_key, msg, sizeof(msg), tmp);
if (!err) {
memcpy(auth, tmp, 8);
}
return err;
}